The Point of ASEAN

(This article originally appeared in the Diplomat back in 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-point-of-asean/)

Many observers of international politics often dismiss the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as increasingly unable to manage regional crises. With the grouping marred by inaction and even a failure to simply issue joint statements over issues, such sentiments on ASEAN are now increasingly commonplace. Just a month after the debacle of its retracted Kunming joint statement on the South China Sea (SCS) disputes, ASEAN barely forwarded a watered-down joint statement on the SCS disputes, to the disappointment of many. The 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Vientiane concluded with a statement that dropped any reference to the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s unfavorable ruling against China. Unsurprisingly, this is not the first time ASEAN has failed to act on or say anything meaningful about prevalent regional issues. In 2006 and 2014, ASEAN maintained a deafening silence as the Thai military staged a coup d’ etat and seized government power.

Given this, as one journalist astutely asked, what is the point of ASEAN?

It is a question I often ask myself as I get more and more invested in the regional intergovernmental organization. To understand ASEAN today requires a working knowledge of its historical purpose. ASEAN was primarily organized in 1967 to manage and contain the increasing external and internal conflicts and threats to the region after World War II and during the Cold War. In the context of a bipolar Cold War world order, ASEAN sought to be a “zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality (ZOPFAN)” to hedge against the United States and the former Soviet Union. Intra-regionally, Southeast Asia was fragmented by intra- and inter-state conflict. As a response, the five founding member-states—Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines—agreed on a “treaty of amity and cooperation” for the “peaceful settlement of regional disputes” under the principles of non-interference and decision making through consensus, also known as the  “ASEAN Way.” A stable regional atmosphere made it possible for member-states to focus on quelling their respective internal conflicts and put all their resources and efforts into the goal of nation-building and economic development, emphasizing national resilience as the road to regional stability.

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Today, it is the same consensus-based decision making and non-interference course of action that once ensured regional security and development that cripples any meaningful action and compromises regional stability. No wonder even its own member-states often place ASEAN on the sidelines as a last-resort option to pursue foreign policy initiatives (see, for example, the Philippines favoring a legal strategy on the SCS dispute over ASEAN mechanisms).

Having studied other forms of regionalism elsewhere, however, I believe that regional intergovernmental organizations matter. They play important roles in both regional and domestic affairs.

In Africa, for example, the African Union automatically suspends any member-state that experiences unconstitutional changes in power from regional activities and gives it six months to restore constitutional rule. The chairperson and the secretary general are not only given the responsibility to condemn coup d’ etats, but also the power to impose a wide range of sanctions, as in Mauritania in 2008. In South America, the Organization of American States (OAS) often plays an active mediating role between the opposition and the government in the event of constitutional crises in its member-states, as in Venezuela in 2002. Such interfering actions and meddling statements are unthinkable for ASEAN, which in 2008 found it almost impossible to convince the military junta in Myanmar to open up to international relief operations in the wake of Cyclone Nargis given the regime’s fears about political change.

What makes the difference? A comparative analysis of regional IGOs shows that engagement from regional civil society and think tank networks, supported by an institutionally-strong secretariat and democratic governments, make regional IGOs more proactive and less fettered by the competing interests of individual member states. In Africa, it took the efforts of an active civil society, a network of indigenous lawyers, and an aggressive secretary general to form its progressive legal document on democracy and human rights. In South America, a watchful network of think tanks and civil society, supported by democratic middle power regimes, created among the earliest regional democratic charters. It is important to note that AU member-states are a mix of authoritarian and democratic regimes, yet the group is widely considered to be more progressive than the OAS, which is comprised of democratic member-states. Apparently, democratic member-state regimes are not necessary for a democratic regional IGO.

This is not to say that the relationship between these regional IGOs and civil society is all positive. In Africa, the exclusivity of AU engagement mechanisms shrinks the space for non-conforming civil society organizations. In South America, civil society engagement with the OAS is often limited to non-controversial issues. However, civil society in these regions wields influence because of the unique constellation of actors who created progressive democratic charters that provide for institutional mechanisms for engagement. Civil society participation is guaranteed and protected by specific charter provisions in both the AU and OAS.

ASEAN, on the contrary, represents a textbook negative case. It is characterized by a handicapped secretariat, a regional civil society network skeptical of its value for engagement, and unwilling democratic governments. The running joke in the region is that the ASEAN Secretariat performs more like a secretary than a general. Staffed only by over 300 personnel with limited funding, the secretariat can barely perform its secretary function, much less a more general-like one.

Further, civil society in Southeast Asia is too frustrated at the slow pace of ASEAN action, if there is any at all, to even think of engagement. Some also maintain a domestic strategy of engagement while others fail to raise their issues and advocacies into the higher regional agenda. Severe repression by ASEAN and its member-states, ranging from tactics of sabotaging people’s forums to choking international funding to outright intimidation, also do not help the progressive causes of civil society. Institutional mechanisms for civil society participation are still virtually non-existent. The region’s more democratic regimes in Indonesia and the Philippines are also reluctant to take the reins of de facto ASEAN leadership. Indonesia, the region’s largest country with the most political clout, is slowly moving beyond an ASEAN-centered foreign policy. According to Rizal Sukma, while ASEAN was once the cornerstone of Indonesia foreign policy, it is now only treated as a cornerstone. Without this complex multilateralism of different actors, ASEAN will remain beholden to individual member-state’s interests and limited in its actions in the foreseeable future.

The way forward for ASEAN is to stay true to its mantra of a “people-centered” community. However, to expect this from ASEAN while leaving its hybrid authoritarian member-states in the driver seat of regionalism is a misguided aspiration. Their fears of political change will hinder any move toward intervention and non-consensus decision making. To achieve this elusive community, the Southeast Asian people must take the reins. This means developing more innovative engagement strategies, making alliances with democratic governments and international actors, and strengthening regional coordination and capacities.

To ask whether there is a point to ASEAN is counterproductive. It reduces interest among ASEAN stakeholders and breeds negative attitudes toward engagement. The point of ASEAN does not hinge on what it is now but on what we, the Southeast Asian peoples, can make it to be. It has vast potential to do a great many things–balance superpowers, strengthen negotiation positions, build confidence among mutually suspicious states, cooperate against transnational human security issues, foster people-to-people connections, and even promote democracy and human rights. But to realize these potentials, as a comparative analysis of regionalism shows, requires the people to take ASEAN away from stubborn member-states and make it their own.

In 2017, the Philippines will be the chair of ASEAN in its 50th year. It is at the helm of setting ASEAN’s direction for its next 50 years. Being one of the more democratic states and having one of the most vibrant civil societies in the region, it is incumbent on the Philippines to lead ASEAN toward a new democratic agenda. After all, ASEAN aspires for a “people-centered” community. Such is the point of ASEAN—for it to be made the institutional mirror of its collective peoples’ aspirations.

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Revisiting Non-Interference in ASEAN: Some Thoughts to Move Forward

Article Two of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which is the fundamental agreement that governs the relations of member-states within ASEAN, mentions of many principles yet are essentially rooted in one—the principle of non-intervention. Borne out of the high level of insecurity among newly decolonized countries in the region, it was but logical for ASEAN to be extremely cautious of any form of external intervention. For the earlier years of its existence, non-intervention worked. The mutual assurance of member-states to keep to their own affairs them to focus on quelling their respective internal conflicts and put all their resources and efforts onto the goal of nation-building and economic development; emphasizing national resilience as the road to regional stability. As a result of this Westphalian view of state sovereignty, ASEAN experienced zero open conflict and war coupled with high levels of economic growth and development.

            Yet, today, it is the same principle of non-intervention that turns a blind eye to human rights violations, breaches of the rule of law, and sheer abuse of state power within member-states; provided that they afford the same privilege to each other. It is the same principle of non-intervention that incapacitates ASEAN to respond to new non-traditional security threats such as human trafficking, transnational crime, and natural disasters. It is the same principle of non-intervention that keeps repressive regimes intact while endangering the lives Southeast Asian peoples.  Amidst the rise of these new threats and problems, all ASEAN appears to be capable of is to issue joint statements expressing deep regret.

            For intervention to work in a highly insecure region of soft-authoritarian states and weak democracies, two changes must occur—the leadership of the region’s more democratic states and the strict adherence to ASEAN centrality in matters of intervention.

            First, democracies are more likely to support intervention in the name of liberal values such as freedom and human rights. In a region with diverse regimes that range from authoritarian hybrids to clear military rule, it is necessary that democracies unambiguously support and lead in opening the agenda for intervention. Yet, the region’s two democracies in Indonesia and the Philippines have foreign policies that look beyond ASEAN. The Philippines blindly remains faithful to its hard alliance with the United States. Indonesia more recently just shifted ASEAN as the cornerstone of their foreign policy to become a cornerstone. Civil society and more regional oriented parliamentarians in both countries can and must do more to pressure their governments to look within the region rather than outside.

Second, much of the distrust for intervention comes from the threat of unilateral action taken by major powers. Indeed, the series of US-led interventions throughout history have destroyed much of the legitimacy of interventions. Evidence suggests that interventions initiated and carried out by regional intergovernmental organizations are more accepted because of its multilateral nature. It thus becomes an imperative that ASEAN ensures that all interventions are initiated, led and carried out by the organization itself. Confidence building measures must also be intensified to create a stronger sense of mutual trust. ASEAN needs to reimagine its role beyond mere supporters of initiatives led by western powers and the UN. It must position itself as the central body leading interventions in the region. Ultimately, however, it is the strengthening of the bureaucratic structure of the organization that would create space for regional intervention mechanisms amidst sovereignty-obsessed states. 

Intervention is not a complex issue whether in ASEAN or anywhere else in the world. When it involves the security of human beings, whether militarily, politically or economically, intervention is not an issue to be debated upon but a responsibility to be immediately taken up. ASEAN remains steadfast to the principle of non-interference only because of the longevity and familiarity of such a code of conduct. If ASEAN remains to be held hostage by its principle of non-interference amidst new and rising threats, it risks becoming among the many dead regional intergovernmental organizations in history

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Making a Southeast Asian Democracy in Their Image: Some Strategies for Democracy Activists in the Region

Southeast Asia is in a democratic regression—both at the domestic and regional level.  Domestically over the last decade, Thailand has regressed severely from a democracy to be ruled by a military junta. Malaysia and its dominant Barisan Nasional continues to viciously crack down on the opposition and any other form of dissent. Singapore remains steadfast to the concentration of power in a one-party system. Cambodia and Myanmar are persistently unapologetic on its human rights abuses. Even the region’s democratic beacons in the Philippines and Indonesia have stalled on its consolidation with the persistence of personalistic and anti-democratic practices amid formal democratic institutions. Once the global model of third wave or late democratization, Southeast Asia shamefully leads the trend of a global democratic rollback.

Regionally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains to be an exclusive club of intergovernmental elites who are largely unchecked and unbalanced by any countervailing force. Decisions that have real consequences on the lives of peoples at the grassroots are made based on elite negotiation with little to no popular consultation. Free trade agreements are made, migration policies are discussed and integration mechanisms are set while the larger population most affected are not given a seat on the negotiation table. Instead, civil society organizations’ (CSOs) meetings are sabotaged, people’s representatives to regional forums are blacklisted and urgent human rights issues are silenced. The democratic deficit at home is spreading to become a regional contagion.

Ironically, the power of civil society and the people is no stranger to Southeast Asia. Iconic social movements such as the EDSA Revolution in the Philippines, the democracy movement in Myanmar, and the more recent Bersih protests in Malaysia have all initiated, sustained, and won political change in their home countries. Regionally, transnational activist networks like the Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA) have been at the forefront of placing the people at the center of the regional agenda. Most state and regional structures are closed and repressive of any form of civil society engagement and contestation to ensure the survival of domestic authoritarian or soft-authoritarian regimes. To find a solution to the democratic deficit therefore needs to shift the focus away from the state or ASEAN towards the strategies CSOs employ to open up political space.

Domestically, CSOs can pressure closed states to open up through internal formalization or international support. The first strategy requires that CSOs formalize and professionalize their internal structure to make them more credible and appealing to governments. This strategy will be most effective during times of stability and when the state already provides a little engagement space. On the other hand, the second strategy recognizes the power asymmetry that favours states over CSOs in terms of sheer resources, machinery, and influence. To address this, domestic CSOs may internationalize domestic issues like democracy and garner the support of the wider international community to reconfigure the balance of power to their favour. This strategy will be most effective during times of crisis and when the state is not only closed but severely repressive of CSOs participation.

Regionally, CSOs can employ two strategies to further the degree of their engagement with ASEAN; namely, through direct regional coordination or through the state channel. The first strategy entails domestic CSOs to build regional partnerships to increase the force of their influence. In this strategy, much relies on the creativity of CSOs to be able to regionalize domestic issues. Partnerships could be built through regional confidence-building measures such as forums and exchanges. Also, CSOs may also create a regional coordinating body to intensify and structure their regionalization. However, this strategy places much faith on the good will of ASEAN as well to actually recognize these CSOs. The second strategy recognizes this limitation by acknowledging that ASEAN remains an intergovernmental organization; thus the best way to influence it is through influence particular member-states to be their voice in regional decision-making. In this strategy, CSOs are most likely to find powerful member-state allies from the regions more democratic states like the Philippines and Indonesia.

In a region where states themselves are threats to the security of their people, democracy is not only a political ideal but more crucially a security necessity. Democracy, being a system that embodies contestation, participation, accountability and protection of basic rights, is the only substantial and sustainable security measure that can protect people from the threat of their own states. To achieve and sustain democracy both at home and in the region cannot be relied on governments—only when people organize around democracy’s ideals and struggle for it strategically can democracy ever be fully realized in Southeast Asia.

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The Challenge of China and How NOT to Respond

There is no doubting the status of China as a global economic superpower. Through the wide expansion of its manufacturing sector, with combined elements of statism and neoliberalism, it created historical record double digit growth rates for 30 straight years. By virtue of its massive size, China is both large and dynamic enough to significantly affect the world economy and contribute to global growth. Through its strategic open engagement of trade and capital flows, China is deeply integrated into the world economy. China, by definition, is a superpower. More crucially for the world, however, it is increasingly acting like one. Rising under conditions defiant of international norms, China poses this century’s major challenge to the existing United States-led global economic order. On the front of trade policy, China is disruptive to the norm of multilateral arrangements and liberalizing obligations. In 2008, it rejected the multilateral initiative of the Doha Round, marking the first failure of a major multilateral negotiation in the postwar period. Consequently, the World Trade Organization-led trade regime is in jeopardy. Instead of multilateralism, it seeks to lead politically-motivated bilateral trade in the Asian region to pit against, not cooperate with, the established trans-Atlantic bloc. With regards to the international monetary system, China continues to frustrate the US by rejecting the rule of a flexible exchange rate policy through its intervention in making the renminbi competitively undervalued. When criticized by the International Monetary Fund, China brazenly questions the existence of the IMF and threatens to create its own Asian counterpart. Indeed, China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is the boldest concrete rejection of a US-dominated global economic governance. On the area of production, China remains to be the world’s manufacturing powerhouse while maintaining its relative independence from foreign capital. The three areas of trade, financial and production are the critical pillars from which the global economic order stand; and China has managed to aggravate every one of them.

China is flexing its muscles; yet the world, primarily the US, still engages it as if it were a status quo superpower. Responses continue to be dominated by cooptive approaches, forcing China to get on board the status quo norms and existing global institutional architecture. These cannot be any more mistaken. The battle for global supremacy begins with a clear understanding of the enemy. China is a revisionist power; it seeks to upend a global economic order that it absolutely had no part building. In this case, efforts to forcibly integrate it to existing norms and institutions are not only misguided but also counterproductive. An effective response necessitates a recognition of the patterns of China’s calculated moves. Yes, a revisionist power ultimately wants to change the status quo. However, it understands that the decks are stacked against it for it throw an immediate huge blow. Critical observation reveals China’s strategy—frustrate the status quo, gauge the response, calculate whether to push forward or step back. Case in point: The Doha Round. After effectively blocking the multilateral trade initiative, it can be argued that China calculated the moves to be made thereafter. Without a strong response from proponents of multilateralism, China pushed to frustrate the global order even further by leading an Asian trading bloc. The same calculations can be observed in China’s approach on the issue of the West Philippine Sea. Initially frustrating international norms by claiming on the basis of its historical nine-dash line, it pushed even further to land reclamation activities in the absence of an effective response from the vocal opposition in the Philippines and Vietnam. The legal approach of the Philippines is another example of engaging China for what it is not; it does not and will not back down on the basis of status quo legalities. A revisionist power will not respond to status quo forces. The world needs to beat China at its own revisionist game.

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Constructivist Reflections on the Philippine Political Economy

(This piece was written primarily as a reaction to my International Political Economy professor's, Prof. Amado Mendoza, opinion piece on his Interaksyon opinion column, entitled "How did the PH economy grow despite the messy political situation? Since then, I have realized it is not a reaction piece, but a reflection. I found that I could not disagree with the critical mind of my Professor... at least regarding this article.)

Photo adopted from the article

Organized around the title question of the opinion piece, the author, Professor Amado Mendoza, makes two thesis statements—first, the policy lag in time from the first point of implementation to the point of the policy fully taking effect makes the results of past economic reforms impervious to the present’s political instability.

Second, the perception of good governance effectively hides and trumps the material reality of incompetence of the current administration. Both hypotheses are with merit. Indeed, macroeconomic policy is as much as getting the correct policy as implementing it at the right time.

Economists and policymakers recognize the difficulty of timing in pursuing certain policies because of lags. The complexity of both the legislative and administrative process creates a temporal disjunction between problems and solutions; the problem and its situational context may change while the solution is still being legislated or implemented.

Macroeconomic policies, therefore, may see its impact only beyond the tenure of the administration that proposed it. The author recognizes this and gives credit to the Ramos administration, three administrations before the current Aquino one, for today’s economic growth. The policy lag effect is common knowledge and already reaches the awareness of Filipinos as part of the mainstream discourse.

The author’s more innovative analysis lies in his argument of “perceptions become material force.” Owing much to the constructivist school, the author recognizes the disconnection between ideational perceptions and material reality. Constructivism, founded on an ontology of subjectivity, argues that reality is not an exogenous and natural fact of life; rather it is constructed by the beliefs, values and norms of society.

In other words, what is real is what is in the heads of the people. President Aquino owes much to his campaign managers who concocted the idea of running under the image of good governance and anti-corruption.

The image is a powerful and resilient one simply because it is consistent with the larger Asian norm structure. Experiences with corrupt authoritarian AND democratic leaders created a strong desire in the Philippines for good governance and anti-corruption.

Indeed, the genius of this presidency, if there is any at all, is the campaign slogan that sticks.

The author relates this to the resilience of economic growth in the face of political instability by describing the nature of today’s economy. Indeed, the economy today is characterized by activities that largely care about perception. The speculative nature of the stock market and other short-term investments like real estate are the current drivers of the Philippine economy, with the Philippine Stock Exchange reaching all-time highs and the real estate market expanding to unforeseen levels.

Noticeably absent are long-term investments in the manufacturing sector that are particularly sensitive to material realities and fundamentals. Considering this fact, it is scary to imagine what will happen to the Philippine economy when perceptions finally catch up with reality.

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The Post-Washington Consensus, Development Models and the Game of Leverage

The world is made up of two actors; there are the ‘rule-makers’ and there are the ‘rule-takers.’ On one hand, the rule-makers have a high degree of both normative and coercive power at their disposal to illicit the obedience of rule-takers. On the other hand, rule-takers, in the absence of sheer coercive power, rely on a counter-normative strategy to resist the imposition of rules. In every aspect of social and power relations, the dynamics between the rule-makers and the rule-takers are focal. In no other are these dynamics more consistently located than in the area of the global political economy, more specifically in the aspect of development. The rule-makers are the United States and the Washington institutions that are the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The rule-takers are developing countries like those in Latin America and Asia. The rule being promoted is the Washington Consensus, a set of policy recommendations by Washington institutions that are essentially neoliberal in character. The game is essentially played by leverage. Prior to the heyday of neoliberalism, developing states engaged in inward-looking models for development. In Latin America, industries were nationalized, protectionist tariffs were instituted and capitalization was found internally. In Asia, the state was more pro-private capital and sponsored domestic businesses through large amounts of technological recapitalization and favourable industrial policies. These models were at the opposite spectrum of US interest; it restricted their access to raw markets of the region. The models, nevertheless, led to incredible strides in economic growth and development in the regions. The leverage was clearly with the developing countries. However, the 1982 debt crisis in Latin America and the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, coupled with a post-Washington Consensus emphasizing democracy, delegitimized the national development models of largely authoritarian regimes in both regions. Latin America adjusted to neoliberal policies conditioned by the IMF for its financial assistance, Northeast Asia saw foreign competition challenge the dominance of state-sponsored domestic businesses, and Southeast Asia became heavily reliant on foreign direct investment and export-oriented industrialization. While there are some minor resistance and indigenization of the adjustment, the post-Washington Consensus of a neoliberal economic order remains intact.

Photo from carmillaonline.com

The political economy of development is a game of leverage. At the surface, it appears that leverage only comes with luck. The crises that discredited the national developmental models of Latin America and Asia were exogenous in nature and thus, outside the control and fault of national economies. But a more critical examination reveals the powerful irony of neoliberal policy. The exogenous crises were results of increasing liberalization of trade, finance and production. The liberalization of the oil market eventually led to an energy price hike that choked Latin American countries to debt. In Asia, the opening up of financial markets led to hot money short term investments and eventually bursting to the Asian Financial Crises. Neoliberal policy, it appears, has a natural mechanism of correcting divergent developmental models by naturally inducing exogenous crisis; making it, in effect, a self-fulfilling prophecy. Leverage is not a matter of luck or natural economic consequences; but, in fact, manipulated and rigged towards neoliberal interests. Such is the genius of the Washington Consensus and institutions. It presents the economy as an organic, objective and apolitical arena where neoliberal policies are the only ‘correct’ path to development. Through the infiltration of ideas in popular and policy spaces through agents of media and the educational system of so-called ‘experts,’ neoliberalism is raised to Gramscian hegemony status. The epitome of the sheer cunningness of neoliberal agents is their ability to adapt and change. When the Washington Consensus was discredited by critiques of socioeconomic inequality, proponents re-legitimised it neoliberalism through the Post-Washington Consensus where little concessions were made to poverty reduction and the discourse of market compatibility with democracy was introduced. It was no longer an issue of neoliberalism causing poverty; but authoritarianism as the bane of these societies and only market-friendly policies can ensure the democracy answer. It was a masterful reframing of critiques. Counter-hegemonic agents against neoliberalism must strike back just as creatively if there is any hope in undermining this neoliberal global order.

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Outreach Activities in Depoliticizing Poverty

            High levels of poverty and inequality have plagued Philippine society since time in memorial. For the past eight years, poverty has remained unchanged: 21.0 percent in 2006, 20.5 percent in 2009 and 19.7 percent in 2012 (NCSB, 2012). Being a problem that has lasted for so long, both government and citizens have developed a highly familiarized, personalized and depoliticized view of poverty; in other words, poverty has become nothing more than a personal trouble (Mills, 1959). This dangerously translates into ineffective government policies and misleading public opinion. The infamous statement of local celebrity Bianca Gonzales (2013) “Bakit nga ba bine-baby ang mga informal settlers?” as a reaction to a government policy of providing monetary and housing assistance to evacuated informal settlers in Quezon City displays the very limited view of poverty by both government and the public. Much of the perspectives on poverty today are culturally and historically ignorant, unaware of the factors of the colonial experience and the global economic order played in deeply rooting and worsening inequality and poverty in the country (Bello, 2009; McCoy, 2009). However, such a limited view on poverty did not simply evolve out of the individual mind throughout time due to the longevity of the issue. The modern social system and the incapability of the human agency to transverse it has led to the dominance of the economic system in modern society (Luhmann, 2012). As a result, different social institutions and cultural practices oriented around the capitalist culture of consumerism and individualism (Baudrillard 1998) have reinforced the factor of time in shaping a one-dimensional and inadequate perspective on poverty In the final analysis, the subtle influence of these institutions and practices have proved to be the greatest hindrance to solving the problem of poverty in the Philippines.

Photo from klimesmeralda.wordpress.com

            Using a structural functionalist framework, this paper argues that the practices of outreaches and public service oriented activities have become capitalistic in nature; which, in turn, contributes to a self-utilitarian, individualistic and depoliticized view of poverty. Through ethnographic-like research, this paper examines how the perspective of the youth has shifted from substantive structural causes of poverty to the pursuit of self-realization. It then roots the argument in the origins of a consumerist culture that dominates society by investigating the structures of class and capitalism in perpetuating it. This paper will conclude by present the general politicized and sociological view on poverty, using the frameworks of political economy and culture, rooting it in the larger socio-cultural structure for a more adequate and effective understanding of the perennial issue of poverty in the Philippines.

II.                Analytical Framework

Structural functionalism is a broad perspective from the disciplines of sociology and anthropology that interprets society as a complex system that is beyond the human beings which comprise it. Its focal point of analysis are social structures and institutions within society, how they interact with each other and with individuals within the social system (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004). Tracing its origins, August Comte (1798-1857) introduced structural functionalism as a theory of society that emanates from biology. He finds the organism as a natural model for society; arguing that the way how an organism relates with its environment, how its parts interrelate within its overall system, and how it maintains balance is similar to the operation of a social system (Harper, 2011). Emile Durkheim, in his classic work Division of Labor (1893), expands structural functionalism in asking how exactly society is able to maintain a level of integration similar to those of organisms. He argues that through interdependency and interaction of individuals with more specialized roles, or mechanical solidarity, social ‘facts’ or institutions emerge which are beyond the individual and has a life on its own. For both theorists, the individual or human agency is downplayed as less deterministic and independent; individuals only act the roles or functions required of them by the social system.

Modern theorists develop a more sophisticated structural functionalist perspective. The German sociologist, Niklas Luhmann (1997), furthers the deconstruction of an anthropocentric view of society and argues that individuals are not integral parts of society; society is a system of communication. It is further divided into autopoeitic communicative spheres—the economy, politics, family, religion and etc.—that operate according to their respective functions based on their own medium and codes. Individuals do not so much act independently but rather participate in the function of a specific communicative sphere by using its medium (Moeller, 2006). That is, the individual merely traverses the different communicative spheres; he does not exist in himself, he exists as part of a social sphere.  The inter-relations of these communicative spheres make up the entire social system. Luhmann, however, emphasizes that in a highly modern society, no communicative sphere will dominate or be the overarching steerer of society unlike the dominance of religion and the family of traditional societies.

Jean Baudrillard (1998) makes an in depth investigation of the economic sphere, the structure of capitalism and its role of propagating a consumerist culture. He argues that human beings have a ‘natural propensity to happiness’ that is mobilized by the myth of equality; the core principle of liberalism that underlies the structure of global capitalism. Happiness is then measured in terms of objects and signs which the individual consumes. It is removed from any collective sense; as being fuelled by egalitarianism, happiness is based on individualistic principles. Propagated by the structures of capitalism and consumerism, the myth of egalitarianism is made real through an equalization of consumption, even in the face of absolute inequality.      

III.             Depoliticising Poverty

Consumerism and Individualism in Outreach Programs

           In an NSTP pagpapalalim session, participants are asked to reflect on the semester-long outreach activities that were conducted. Composing of students who mostly come from similar middle class backgrounds, the reflections they gave also followed a common theme—NSTP has been a source for self-actualisation or “feel-good” sentiments. A number of students commented that they “felt good” helping people less fortunate than they. Another number of students said that it allowed them to “break out from their comfort zones” and that it was “fulfilling” to participate in such humanitarian activities. When asked about what they think they could do to further help the less fortunate, the class was united in answering “remind them to do well in school and make right decisions.”

It is clear from the anecdotal evidences that the practices of outreach and other public service oriented activities, which are so often engaged in by the youth, have been means for self-actualization and fulfillment. The unifying theme of all the reflections of the NSTP participants have been oriented around self-focused words such as “felt good” and “fulfilling.” As much as self-oriented their reflections were, their view on poverty and the plight of the less fortunate is just as individualistic—to win against poverty, the less fortunate must individually excel in activities increasing social mobility.

Tracing Consumerism and Individualism in the Structures of Class and Capitalism

It is convenient to account such a personal-utilitarian and depoliticized view of poverty to the unique conditions of the individual. However, it is grossly mistaken. According to structural functionalists, the individual is insignificant; it is the larger social structures that make up society which determine the predispositions of the individual (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004). Analysing the described phenomenon in such terms entails a close examination of the practices of outreaches and service-oriented activities in the context of the larger social institutions and structures in which they are embedded in. As argued earlier, the reflections of the youth reveal an individualistic, self-focused view and the very manner in which outreach activities are carried out has a very capitalistic nature. Under these conditions, poverty becomes a commodified form of self-actualization and happiness that is consumed by the youth through outreach activities.

Using such a framework, outreach activities and the likes are revealed as commodities that are instrumental to the very survival of capitalism. Systems function to survive (Luhmann, 2012); the high levels of sophistication of the modern capitalist system allows it to coopt anti-capitalist activities and transform them into capitalistic ones.  On the surface, charitable acts such as these appear to go against the very individualistic principles of capitalism; but a critical analysis reveals that such acts have resembled an industry that merely reproduces the capitalist system.

The strong structures of capitalism and class have contributed to the dominance of the consumerist culture that is observed even in supposedly non-capitalist, to an extent anti-capitalist, activities such as outreaches and other public service oriented activities (Hickel, 2013).  According to Baudrillard (1997), consumerism is built on the hegemony of the liberal-capitalist idea that the biological propensity of human beings for happiness can be achieved through equality. However, Baudrillard is critical of the concept of equality, arguing that equality is a myth perpetuated by a capitalist system that lives on its existence. To his mind, equality is not considered in absolute terms; but in terms of objects and other manifest signs of success and happiness. In other words, the happiness of an individual is based on the objects he consumes.

The manner which outreach activities are carried out show that it is highly oriented around the manifest signs and objects of well-being (Baudrillard, 1997), a characteristic of consumerism. Outreach activities are commonly programmed into three parts: activities, feeding and goods giving.

First, the activities that are being done are usually in the form of games and other fun exercises, under the simple purpose of “giving joy and making them (the poor) forget of their troubles even for a while.” Sometimes, it is even noticeable that some of the activities have become sources of enjoyment for the facilitators instead, while some of the target participants have become uninterested. When a happiness is manifested through smiles and laughter, the program is deemed to be a success. In other cases, activities are oriented around education; teaching the target participants about the environment, leadership, literacy or financial literacy. While such are indeed important, the teachings merely reinforce the existing liberal-capitalist idea of “every man for himself.” It frames a way of thinking that poverty is caused by lack of skill instead of “a collapse in the structure of opportunities” (David, 2000). The plight of participants are attributed to their individual failure, emptying the argument of the failure of the system they are trapped in.

Second and the last, feeding programs and goods giving replicate exactly what Baudrillard critiques as the myth of egalitarianism before consumption. For a brief moment in time, the inequality between the privileged facilitators and the underprivileged participants is blurred as they are able to consume the same food and goods. It also becomes a direct form of consumerism, one can only speculate how much capitalist firms have profited from such charitable activities.

On the surface, outreach and other charitable activities reflect countercultural and anti-capitalist values; however it did not take long before a powerful capitalist system was able to co-opt such ethics. Such acts of counter-capitalism are neutralized and channeled back into new forms of virtuous-consumption (Hickel, 2013). Sociologist Slavoj Zizek (2009) calls this the “redemptive quality of consumerism”—in the act of consumption, the consumers are not only buying their redemption from mainstream capitalism, but also its vicious effects on the world. As argued, outreach and charitable activities have become part of these “virtuous commodities” (Hickel and Khan 2012). Sociologist Jason Hickel (2013) puts it well “people think of this as a countercultural process – a process by which the individual resists society – but in fact it has become essential to the reproduction of capitalism, for the primary method of self-realization has become consumption.”

The infiltration of the capitalist system and liberal ideology into non-capitalist activities has been an evolutionary process of history. As noted before, German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (1997) argued that in a modern society, no one social sphere dominates the system; not even the economic system. However, even Luhmann admits that modernity is an evolutionary process that still continues to occur in society today. Scholars have also argued that Luhmann is more post-modern than he is modern (Moeller, 2006). In his famous the end of history thesis, Francis Fukuyama (1992) argues that the victory of the west in the cold war marked the end of history; the end of an ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberalism and capitalism as political and economic orders, respectively. Liberalism, as an ideology, is largely apolitical; with emphasis on individual rights and on compromise (Heywood, 2007), it breeds a centrist ideology and argues that the individual lives and dies by his own hand.  The dominating victory of capitalism and liberalism as the hegemonic forces of the world order explains how even anti-capitalist activities such as outreaches and charities are transformed into vehicles for consumerism and individual self-actualization, empty of any political critique of the larger social structure of the liberal world order as a possible root cause of poverty.

IV.             Conclusion

The American sociologist C. Wright Mills (1959) says it right: “when, in a city of 100,000, only one man is unemployed, that is his personal trouble, and for its relief we properly look to the character of the man, his skills, and his immediate opportunities. But when in a nation of 50 million employees, 15 million men are unemployed, that is an issue, and we may not hope to find its solution within the range of opportunities open to any one individual.”

Indeed, poverty, at its high levels in the Philippines, is beyond the milieu of the individual; poverty is a public issue that roots itself in the fundamental structure of Philippine society as it is embedded in the larger global political economy.

Baudrillard furthers his argument about consumerism and capitalism by including the structure of class. He argues that capitalism is a function of inequality; its survival as a system is highly dependent upon the maintenance of an order of privilege and class. The inequality that is inherent in capitalism is blurred by the myth of egalitarianism pushed by consumerism. The function of class and privilege is “precisely to reproduce caste and class privilege” (1997). In other words, the survival of a capitalist system is dependent upon the maintenance of inequality and class difference as it is hidden behind the façade of consumerism. However, while Baudrillard emphasizes that “the system knows only the conditions of its survival, it knows nothing of social and individual contents”, opportunities for redistribution and genuine equality lies in the social structure. However, in the Philippines, such a structure has broken down.

In his famous book The Anarchy of Families, Alfred McCoy (2009) traces inequality in the Philippines through the power structure that privileges a minority over the majority. The power structure of Philippine society has largely been built by the Spanish and American colonizers. During the Spanish colonial period, families who cooperated with the Spanish colonizers in their divide and rule strategy lorded over fellow Filipinos with vast amounts of land or haciendas granted to them. These haciendas were incomparable in terms of size to that of any other Southeast Asian country. American colonial policy further exacerbated this by giving the landed oligarchs institutional access to the state apparatus. When the privileged minority is able to control the state, the only institution powerful enough to redistribute wealth to the underprivileged is rendered useless in this regard.

It is disappointing to see the ignorance or sheer hypocrisy of policymakers in the Philippines to address the issue of poverty. According to Filipino sociologist Randolf David (1999), every administration had attempted to solve poverty while choosing to turn a blind eye to the larger social structure that maintains it. Cory Aquino treated it as a matter of charity, Ramos viewed it as an inevitable consequence of economic development, and Estrada treated it hand in hand with development. However, all these efforts merely reproduce the inherently unequal capitalist system, hypocritically legitimizing it as a solution to poverty. Indeed, Baudrillard (1997) says it best, “if poverty and nuisance cannot be eliminated, this is because they are anywhere but in the poor neighbourhoods. They are not in the slums or shanty-towns, but in the socio-economic structure.” When the economic elites are also the ones steering the state, any radical change to the unequal structure of Philippine society will never happen.

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