Making a Southeast Asian Democracy in Their Image: Some Strategies for Democracy Activists in the Region

Southeast Asia is in a democratic regression—both at the domestic and regional level.  Domestically over the last decade, Thailand has regressed severely from a democracy to be ruled by a military junta. Malaysia and its dominant Barisan Nasional continues to viciously crack down on the opposition and any other form of dissent. Singapore remains steadfast to the concentration of power in a one-party system. Cambodia and Myanmar are persistently unapologetic on its human rights abuses. Even the region’s democratic beacons in the Philippines and Indonesia have stalled on its consolidation with the persistence of personalistic and anti-democratic practices amid formal democratic institutions. Once the global model of third wave or late democratization, Southeast Asia shamefully leads the trend of a global democratic rollback.

Regionally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains to be an exclusive club of intergovernmental elites who are largely unchecked and unbalanced by any countervailing force. Decisions that have real consequences on the lives of peoples at the grassroots are made based on elite negotiation with little to no popular consultation. Free trade agreements are made, migration policies are discussed and integration mechanisms are set while the larger population most affected are not given a seat on the negotiation table. Instead, civil society organizations’ (CSOs) meetings are sabotaged, people’s representatives to regional forums are blacklisted and urgent human rights issues are silenced. The democratic deficit at home is spreading to become a regional contagion.

Ironically, the power of civil society and the people is no stranger to Southeast Asia. Iconic social movements such as the EDSA Revolution in the Philippines, the democracy movement in Myanmar, and the more recent Bersih protests in Malaysia have all initiated, sustained, and won political change in their home countries. Regionally, transnational activist networks like the Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA) have been at the forefront of placing the people at the center of the regional agenda. Most state and regional structures are closed and repressive of any form of civil society engagement and contestation to ensure the survival of domestic authoritarian or soft-authoritarian regimes. To find a solution to the democratic deficit therefore needs to shift the focus away from the state or ASEAN towards the strategies CSOs employ to open up political space.

Domestically, CSOs can pressure closed states to open up through internal formalization or international support. The first strategy requires that CSOs formalize and professionalize their internal structure to make them more credible and appealing to governments. This strategy will be most effective during times of stability and when the state already provides a little engagement space. On the other hand, the second strategy recognizes the power asymmetry that favours states over CSOs in terms of sheer resources, machinery, and influence. To address this, domestic CSOs may internationalize domestic issues like democracy and garner the support of the wider international community to reconfigure the balance of power to their favour. This strategy will be most effective during times of crisis and when the state is not only closed but severely repressive of CSOs participation.

Regionally, CSOs can employ two strategies to further the degree of their engagement with ASEAN; namely, through direct regional coordination or through the state channel. The first strategy entails domestic CSOs to build regional partnerships to increase the force of their influence. In this strategy, much relies on the creativity of CSOs to be able to regionalize domestic issues. Partnerships could be built through regional confidence-building measures such as forums and exchanges. Also, CSOs may also create a regional coordinating body to intensify and structure their regionalization. However, this strategy places much faith on the good will of ASEAN as well to actually recognize these CSOs. The second strategy recognizes this limitation by acknowledging that ASEAN remains an intergovernmental organization; thus the best way to influence it is through influence particular member-states to be their voice in regional decision-making. In this strategy, CSOs are most likely to find powerful member-state allies from the regions more democratic states like the Philippines and Indonesia.

In a region where states themselves are threats to the security of their people, democracy is not only a political ideal but more crucially a security necessity. Democracy, being a system that embodies contestation, participation, accountability and protection of basic rights, is the only substantial and sustainable security measure that can protect people from the threat of their own states. To achieve and sustain democracy both at home and in the region cannot be relied on governments—only when people organize around democracy’s ideals and struggle for it strategically can democracy ever be fully realized in Southeast Asia.