Revisiting Non-Interference in ASEAN: Some Thoughts to Move Forward

Article Two of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which is the fundamental agreement that governs the relations of member-states within ASEAN, mentions of many principles yet are essentially rooted in one—the principle of non-intervention. Borne out of the high level of insecurity among newly decolonized countries in the region, it was but logical for ASEAN to be extremely cautious of any form of external intervention. For the earlier years of its existence, non-intervention worked. The mutual assurance of member-states to keep to their own affairs them to focus on quelling their respective internal conflicts and put all their resources and efforts onto the goal of nation-building and economic development; emphasizing national resilience as the road to regional stability. As a result of this Westphalian view of state sovereignty, ASEAN experienced zero open conflict and war coupled with high levels of economic growth and development.

            Yet, today, it is the same principle of non-intervention that turns a blind eye to human rights violations, breaches of the rule of law, and sheer abuse of state power within member-states; provided that they afford the same privilege to each other. It is the same principle of non-intervention that incapacitates ASEAN to respond to new non-traditional security threats such as human trafficking, transnational crime, and natural disasters. It is the same principle of non-intervention that keeps repressive regimes intact while endangering the lives Southeast Asian peoples.  Amidst the rise of these new threats and problems, all ASEAN appears to be capable of is to issue joint statements expressing deep regret.

            For intervention to work in a highly insecure region of soft-authoritarian states and weak democracies, two changes must occur—the leadership of the region’s more democratic states and the strict adherence to ASEAN centrality in matters of intervention.

            First, democracies are more likely to support intervention in the name of liberal values such as freedom and human rights. In a region with diverse regimes that range from authoritarian hybrids to clear military rule, it is necessary that democracies unambiguously support and lead in opening the agenda for intervention. Yet, the region’s two democracies in Indonesia and the Philippines have foreign policies that look beyond ASEAN. The Philippines blindly remains faithful to its hard alliance with the United States. Indonesia more recently just shifted ASEAN as the cornerstone of their foreign policy to become a cornerstone. Civil society and more regional oriented parliamentarians in both countries can and must do more to pressure their governments to look within the region rather than outside.

Second, much of the distrust for intervention comes from the threat of unilateral action taken by major powers. Indeed, the series of US-led interventions throughout history have destroyed much of the legitimacy of interventions. Evidence suggests that interventions initiated and carried out by regional intergovernmental organizations are more accepted because of its multilateral nature. It thus becomes an imperative that ASEAN ensures that all interventions are initiated, led and carried out by the organization itself. Confidence building measures must also be intensified to create a stronger sense of mutual trust. ASEAN needs to reimagine its role beyond mere supporters of initiatives led by western powers and the UN. It must position itself as the central body leading interventions in the region. Ultimately, however, it is the strengthening of the bureaucratic structure of the organization that would create space for regional intervention mechanisms amidst sovereignty-obsessed states. 

Intervention is not a complex issue whether in ASEAN or anywhere else in the world. When it involves the security of human beings, whether militarily, politically or economically, intervention is not an issue to be debated upon but a responsibility to be immediately taken up. ASEAN remains steadfast to the principle of non-interference only because of the longevity and familiarity of such a code of conduct. If ASEAN remains to be held hostage by its principle of non-interference amidst new and rising threats, it risks becoming among the many dead regional intergovernmental organizations in history

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Making a Southeast Asian Democracy in Their Image: Some Strategies for Democracy Activists in the Region

Southeast Asia is in a democratic regression—both at the domestic and regional level.  Domestically over the last decade, Thailand has regressed severely from a democracy to be ruled by a military junta. Malaysia and its dominant Barisan Nasional continues to viciously crack down on the opposition and any other form of dissent. Singapore remains steadfast to the concentration of power in a one-party system. Cambodia and Myanmar are persistently unapologetic on its human rights abuses. Even the region’s democratic beacons in the Philippines and Indonesia have stalled on its consolidation with the persistence of personalistic and anti-democratic practices amid formal democratic institutions. Once the global model of third wave or late democratization, Southeast Asia shamefully leads the trend of a global democratic rollback.

Regionally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains to be an exclusive club of intergovernmental elites who are largely unchecked and unbalanced by any countervailing force. Decisions that have real consequences on the lives of peoples at the grassroots are made based on elite negotiation with little to no popular consultation. Free trade agreements are made, migration policies are discussed and integration mechanisms are set while the larger population most affected are not given a seat on the negotiation table. Instead, civil society organizations’ (CSOs) meetings are sabotaged, people’s representatives to regional forums are blacklisted and urgent human rights issues are silenced. The democratic deficit at home is spreading to become a regional contagion.

Ironically, the power of civil society and the people is no stranger to Southeast Asia. Iconic social movements such as the EDSA Revolution in the Philippines, the democracy movement in Myanmar, and the more recent Bersih protests in Malaysia have all initiated, sustained, and won political change in their home countries. Regionally, transnational activist networks like the Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA) have been at the forefront of placing the people at the center of the regional agenda. Most state and regional structures are closed and repressive of any form of civil society engagement and contestation to ensure the survival of domestic authoritarian or soft-authoritarian regimes. To find a solution to the democratic deficit therefore needs to shift the focus away from the state or ASEAN towards the strategies CSOs employ to open up political space.

Domestically, CSOs can pressure closed states to open up through internal formalization or international support. The first strategy requires that CSOs formalize and professionalize their internal structure to make them more credible and appealing to governments. This strategy will be most effective during times of stability and when the state already provides a little engagement space. On the other hand, the second strategy recognizes the power asymmetry that favours states over CSOs in terms of sheer resources, machinery, and influence. To address this, domestic CSOs may internationalize domestic issues like democracy and garner the support of the wider international community to reconfigure the balance of power to their favour. This strategy will be most effective during times of crisis and when the state is not only closed but severely repressive of CSOs participation.

Regionally, CSOs can employ two strategies to further the degree of their engagement with ASEAN; namely, through direct regional coordination or through the state channel. The first strategy entails domestic CSOs to build regional partnerships to increase the force of their influence. In this strategy, much relies on the creativity of CSOs to be able to regionalize domestic issues. Partnerships could be built through regional confidence-building measures such as forums and exchanges. Also, CSOs may also create a regional coordinating body to intensify and structure their regionalization. However, this strategy places much faith on the good will of ASEAN as well to actually recognize these CSOs. The second strategy recognizes this limitation by acknowledging that ASEAN remains an intergovernmental organization; thus the best way to influence it is through influence particular member-states to be their voice in regional decision-making. In this strategy, CSOs are most likely to find powerful member-state allies from the regions more democratic states like the Philippines and Indonesia.

In a region where states themselves are threats to the security of their people, democracy is not only a political ideal but more crucially a security necessity. Democracy, being a system that embodies contestation, participation, accountability and protection of basic rights, is the only substantial and sustainable security measure that can protect people from the threat of their own states. To achieve and sustain democracy both at home and in the region cannot be relied on governments—only when people organize around democracy’s ideals and struggle for it strategically can democracy ever be fully realized in Southeast Asia.

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The Challenge of China and How NOT to Respond

There is no doubting the status of China as a global economic superpower. Through the wide expansion of its manufacturing sector, with combined elements of statism and neoliberalism, it created historical record double digit growth rates for 30 straight years. By virtue of its massive size, China is both large and dynamic enough to significantly affect the world economy and contribute to global growth. Through its strategic open engagement of trade and capital flows, China is deeply integrated into the world economy. China, by definition, is a superpower. More crucially for the world, however, it is increasingly acting like one. Rising under conditions defiant of international norms, China poses this century’s major challenge to the existing United States-led global economic order. On the front of trade policy, China is disruptive to the norm of multilateral arrangements and liberalizing obligations. In 2008, it rejected the multilateral initiative of the Doha Round, marking the first failure of a major multilateral negotiation in the postwar period. Consequently, the World Trade Organization-led trade regime is in jeopardy. Instead of multilateralism, it seeks to lead politically-motivated bilateral trade in the Asian region to pit against, not cooperate with, the established trans-Atlantic bloc. With regards to the international monetary system, China continues to frustrate the US by rejecting the rule of a flexible exchange rate policy through its intervention in making the renminbi competitively undervalued. When criticized by the International Monetary Fund, China brazenly questions the existence of the IMF and threatens to create its own Asian counterpart. Indeed, China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is the boldest concrete rejection of a US-dominated global economic governance. On the area of production, China remains to be the world’s manufacturing powerhouse while maintaining its relative independence from foreign capital. The three areas of trade, financial and production are the critical pillars from which the global economic order stand; and China has managed to aggravate every one of them.

China is flexing its muscles; yet the world, primarily the US, still engages it as if it were a status quo superpower. Responses continue to be dominated by cooptive approaches, forcing China to get on board the status quo norms and existing global institutional architecture. These cannot be any more mistaken. The battle for global supremacy begins with a clear understanding of the enemy. China is a revisionist power; it seeks to upend a global economic order that it absolutely had no part building. In this case, efforts to forcibly integrate it to existing norms and institutions are not only misguided but also counterproductive. An effective response necessitates a recognition of the patterns of China’s calculated moves. Yes, a revisionist power ultimately wants to change the status quo. However, it understands that the decks are stacked against it for it throw an immediate huge blow. Critical observation reveals China’s strategy—frustrate the status quo, gauge the response, calculate whether to push forward or step back. Case in point: The Doha Round. After effectively blocking the multilateral trade initiative, it can be argued that China calculated the moves to be made thereafter. Without a strong response from proponents of multilateralism, China pushed to frustrate the global order even further by leading an Asian trading bloc. The same calculations can be observed in China’s approach on the issue of the West Philippine Sea. Initially frustrating international norms by claiming on the basis of its historical nine-dash line, it pushed even further to land reclamation activities in the absence of an effective response from the vocal opposition in the Philippines and Vietnam. The legal approach of the Philippines is another example of engaging China for what it is not; it does not and will not back down on the basis of status quo legalities. A revisionist power will not respond to status quo forces. The world needs to beat China at its own revisionist game.

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Constructivist Reflections on the Philippine Political Economy

(This piece was written primarily as a reaction to my International Political Economy professor's, Prof. Amado Mendoza, opinion piece on his Interaksyon opinion column, entitled "How did the PH economy grow despite the messy political situation? Since then, I have realized it is not a reaction piece, but a reflection. I found that I could not disagree with the critical mind of my Professor... at least regarding this article.)

Photo adopted from the article

Organized around the title question of the opinion piece, the author, Professor Amado Mendoza, makes two thesis statements—first, the policy lag in time from the first point of implementation to the point of the policy fully taking effect makes the results of past economic reforms impervious to the present’s political instability.

Second, the perception of good governance effectively hides and trumps the material reality of incompetence of the current administration. Both hypotheses are with merit. Indeed, macroeconomic policy is as much as getting the correct policy as implementing it at the right time.

Economists and policymakers recognize the difficulty of timing in pursuing certain policies because of lags. The complexity of both the legislative and administrative process creates a temporal disjunction between problems and solutions; the problem and its situational context may change while the solution is still being legislated or implemented.

Macroeconomic policies, therefore, may see its impact only beyond the tenure of the administration that proposed it. The author recognizes this and gives credit to the Ramos administration, three administrations before the current Aquino one, for today’s economic growth. The policy lag effect is common knowledge and already reaches the awareness of Filipinos as part of the mainstream discourse.

The author’s more innovative analysis lies in his argument of “perceptions become material force.” Owing much to the constructivist school, the author recognizes the disconnection between ideational perceptions and material reality. Constructivism, founded on an ontology of subjectivity, argues that reality is not an exogenous and natural fact of life; rather it is constructed by the beliefs, values and norms of society.

In other words, what is real is what is in the heads of the people. President Aquino owes much to his campaign managers who concocted the idea of running under the image of good governance and anti-corruption.

The image is a powerful and resilient one simply because it is consistent with the larger Asian norm structure. Experiences with corrupt authoritarian AND democratic leaders created a strong desire in the Philippines for good governance and anti-corruption.

Indeed, the genius of this presidency, if there is any at all, is the campaign slogan that sticks.

The author relates this to the resilience of economic growth in the face of political instability by describing the nature of today’s economy. Indeed, the economy today is characterized by activities that largely care about perception. The speculative nature of the stock market and other short-term investments like real estate are the current drivers of the Philippine economy, with the Philippine Stock Exchange reaching all-time highs and the real estate market expanding to unforeseen levels.

Noticeably absent are long-term investments in the manufacturing sector that are particularly sensitive to material realities and fundamentals. Considering this fact, it is scary to imagine what will happen to the Philippine economy when perceptions finally catch up with reality.

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The Post-Washington Consensus, Development Models and the Game of Leverage

The world is made up of two actors; there are the ‘rule-makers’ and there are the ‘rule-takers.’ On one hand, the rule-makers have a high degree of both normative and coercive power at their disposal to illicit the obedience of rule-takers. On the other hand, rule-takers, in the absence of sheer coercive power, rely on a counter-normative strategy to resist the imposition of rules. In every aspect of social and power relations, the dynamics between the rule-makers and the rule-takers are focal. In no other are these dynamics more consistently located than in the area of the global political economy, more specifically in the aspect of development. The rule-makers are the United States and the Washington institutions that are the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The rule-takers are developing countries like those in Latin America and Asia. The rule being promoted is the Washington Consensus, a set of policy recommendations by Washington institutions that are essentially neoliberal in character. The game is essentially played by leverage. Prior to the heyday of neoliberalism, developing states engaged in inward-looking models for development. In Latin America, industries were nationalized, protectionist tariffs were instituted and capitalization was found internally. In Asia, the state was more pro-private capital and sponsored domestic businesses through large amounts of technological recapitalization and favourable industrial policies. These models were at the opposite spectrum of US interest; it restricted their access to raw markets of the region. The models, nevertheless, led to incredible strides in economic growth and development in the regions. The leverage was clearly with the developing countries. However, the 1982 debt crisis in Latin America and the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, coupled with a post-Washington Consensus emphasizing democracy, delegitimized the national development models of largely authoritarian regimes in both regions. Latin America adjusted to neoliberal policies conditioned by the IMF for its financial assistance, Northeast Asia saw foreign competition challenge the dominance of state-sponsored domestic businesses, and Southeast Asia became heavily reliant on foreign direct investment and export-oriented industrialization. While there are some minor resistance and indigenization of the adjustment, the post-Washington Consensus of a neoliberal economic order remains intact.

Photo from carmillaonline.com

The political economy of development is a game of leverage. At the surface, it appears that leverage only comes with luck. The crises that discredited the national developmental models of Latin America and Asia were exogenous in nature and thus, outside the control and fault of national economies. But a more critical examination reveals the powerful irony of neoliberal policy. The exogenous crises were results of increasing liberalization of trade, finance and production. The liberalization of the oil market eventually led to an energy price hike that choked Latin American countries to debt. In Asia, the opening up of financial markets led to hot money short term investments and eventually bursting to the Asian Financial Crises. Neoliberal policy, it appears, has a natural mechanism of correcting divergent developmental models by naturally inducing exogenous crisis; making it, in effect, a self-fulfilling prophecy. Leverage is not a matter of luck or natural economic consequences; but, in fact, manipulated and rigged towards neoliberal interests. Such is the genius of the Washington Consensus and institutions. It presents the economy as an organic, objective and apolitical arena where neoliberal policies are the only ‘correct’ path to development. Through the infiltration of ideas in popular and policy spaces through agents of media and the educational system of so-called ‘experts,’ neoliberalism is raised to Gramscian hegemony status. The epitome of the sheer cunningness of neoliberal agents is their ability to adapt and change. When the Washington Consensus was discredited by critiques of socioeconomic inequality, proponents re-legitimised it neoliberalism through the Post-Washington Consensus where little concessions were made to poverty reduction and the discourse of market compatibility with democracy was introduced. It was no longer an issue of neoliberalism causing poverty; but authoritarianism as the bane of these societies and only market-friendly policies can ensure the democracy answer. It was a masterful reframing of critiques. Counter-hegemonic agents against neoliberalism must strike back just as creatively if there is any hope in undermining this neoliberal global order.

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Outreach Activities in Depoliticizing Poverty

            High levels of poverty and inequality have plagued Philippine society since time in memorial. For the past eight years, poverty has remained unchanged: 21.0 percent in 2006, 20.5 percent in 2009 and 19.7 percent in 2012 (NCSB, 2012). Being a problem that has lasted for so long, both government and citizens have developed a highly familiarized, personalized and depoliticized view of poverty; in other words, poverty has become nothing more than a personal trouble (Mills, 1959). This dangerously translates into ineffective government policies and misleading public opinion. The infamous statement of local celebrity Bianca Gonzales (2013) “Bakit nga ba bine-baby ang mga informal settlers?” as a reaction to a government policy of providing monetary and housing assistance to evacuated informal settlers in Quezon City displays the very limited view of poverty by both government and the public. Much of the perspectives on poverty today are culturally and historically ignorant, unaware of the factors of the colonial experience and the global economic order played in deeply rooting and worsening inequality and poverty in the country (Bello, 2009; McCoy, 2009). However, such a limited view on poverty did not simply evolve out of the individual mind throughout time due to the longevity of the issue. The modern social system and the incapability of the human agency to transverse it has led to the dominance of the economic system in modern society (Luhmann, 2012). As a result, different social institutions and cultural practices oriented around the capitalist culture of consumerism and individualism (Baudrillard 1998) have reinforced the factor of time in shaping a one-dimensional and inadequate perspective on poverty In the final analysis, the subtle influence of these institutions and practices have proved to be the greatest hindrance to solving the problem of poverty in the Philippines.

Photo from klimesmeralda.wordpress.com

            Using a structural functionalist framework, this paper argues that the practices of outreaches and public service oriented activities have become capitalistic in nature; which, in turn, contributes to a self-utilitarian, individualistic and depoliticized view of poverty. Through ethnographic-like research, this paper examines how the perspective of the youth has shifted from substantive structural causes of poverty to the pursuit of self-realization. It then roots the argument in the origins of a consumerist culture that dominates society by investigating the structures of class and capitalism in perpetuating it. This paper will conclude by present the general politicized and sociological view on poverty, using the frameworks of political economy and culture, rooting it in the larger socio-cultural structure for a more adequate and effective understanding of the perennial issue of poverty in the Philippines.

II.                Analytical Framework

Structural functionalism is a broad perspective from the disciplines of sociology and anthropology that interprets society as a complex system that is beyond the human beings which comprise it. Its focal point of analysis are social structures and institutions within society, how they interact with each other and with individuals within the social system (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004). Tracing its origins, August Comte (1798-1857) introduced structural functionalism as a theory of society that emanates from biology. He finds the organism as a natural model for society; arguing that the way how an organism relates with its environment, how its parts interrelate within its overall system, and how it maintains balance is similar to the operation of a social system (Harper, 2011). Emile Durkheim, in his classic work Division of Labor (1893), expands structural functionalism in asking how exactly society is able to maintain a level of integration similar to those of organisms. He argues that through interdependency and interaction of individuals with more specialized roles, or mechanical solidarity, social ‘facts’ or institutions emerge which are beyond the individual and has a life on its own. For both theorists, the individual or human agency is downplayed as less deterministic and independent; individuals only act the roles or functions required of them by the social system.

Modern theorists develop a more sophisticated structural functionalist perspective. The German sociologist, Niklas Luhmann (1997), furthers the deconstruction of an anthropocentric view of society and argues that individuals are not integral parts of society; society is a system of communication. It is further divided into autopoeitic communicative spheres—the economy, politics, family, religion and etc.—that operate according to their respective functions based on their own medium and codes. Individuals do not so much act independently but rather participate in the function of a specific communicative sphere by using its medium (Moeller, 2006). That is, the individual merely traverses the different communicative spheres; he does not exist in himself, he exists as part of a social sphere.  The inter-relations of these communicative spheres make up the entire social system. Luhmann, however, emphasizes that in a highly modern society, no communicative sphere will dominate or be the overarching steerer of society unlike the dominance of religion and the family of traditional societies.

Jean Baudrillard (1998) makes an in depth investigation of the economic sphere, the structure of capitalism and its role of propagating a consumerist culture. He argues that human beings have a ‘natural propensity to happiness’ that is mobilized by the myth of equality; the core principle of liberalism that underlies the structure of global capitalism. Happiness is then measured in terms of objects and signs which the individual consumes. It is removed from any collective sense; as being fuelled by egalitarianism, happiness is based on individualistic principles. Propagated by the structures of capitalism and consumerism, the myth of egalitarianism is made real through an equalization of consumption, even in the face of absolute inequality.      

III.             Depoliticising Poverty

Consumerism and Individualism in Outreach Programs

           In an NSTP pagpapalalim session, participants are asked to reflect on the semester-long outreach activities that were conducted. Composing of students who mostly come from similar middle class backgrounds, the reflections they gave also followed a common theme—NSTP has been a source for self-actualisation or “feel-good” sentiments. A number of students commented that they “felt good” helping people less fortunate than they. Another number of students said that it allowed them to “break out from their comfort zones” and that it was “fulfilling” to participate in such humanitarian activities. When asked about what they think they could do to further help the less fortunate, the class was united in answering “remind them to do well in school and make right decisions.”

It is clear from the anecdotal evidences that the practices of outreach and other public service oriented activities, which are so often engaged in by the youth, have been means for self-actualization and fulfillment. The unifying theme of all the reflections of the NSTP participants have been oriented around self-focused words such as “felt good” and “fulfilling.” As much as self-oriented their reflections were, their view on poverty and the plight of the less fortunate is just as individualistic—to win against poverty, the less fortunate must individually excel in activities increasing social mobility.

Tracing Consumerism and Individualism in the Structures of Class and Capitalism

It is convenient to account such a personal-utilitarian and depoliticized view of poverty to the unique conditions of the individual. However, it is grossly mistaken. According to structural functionalists, the individual is insignificant; it is the larger social structures that make up society which determine the predispositions of the individual (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004). Analysing the described phenomenon in such terms entails a close examination of the practices of outreaches and service-oriented activities in the context of the larger social institutions and structures in which they are embedded in. As argued earlier, the reflections of the youth reveal an individualistic, self-focused view and the very manner in which outreach activities are carried out has a very capitalistic nature. Under these conditions, poverty becomes a commodified form of self-actualization and happiness that is consumed by the youth through outreach activities.

Using such a framework, outreach activities and the likes are revealed as commodities that are instrumental to the very survival of capitalism. Systems function to survive (Luhmann, 2012); the high levels of sophistication of the modern capitalist system allows it to coopt anti-capitalist activities and transform them into capitalistic ones.  On the surface, charitable acts such as these appear to go against the very individualistic principles of capitalism; but a critical analysis reveals that such acts have resembled an industry that merely reproduces the capitalist system.

The strong structures of capitalism and class have contributed to the dominance of the consumerist culture that is observed even in supposedly non-capitalist, to an extent anti-capitalist, activities such as outreaches and other public service oriented activities (Hickel, 2013).  According to Baudrillard (1997), consumerism is built on the hegemony of the liberal-capitalist idea that the biological propensity of human beings for happiness can be achieved through equality. However, Baudrillard is critical of the concept of equality, arguing that equality is a myth perpetuated by a capitalist system that lives on its existence. To his mind, equality is not considered in absolute terms; but in terms of objects and other manifest signs of success and happiness. In other words, the happiness of an individual is based on the objects he consumes.

The manner which outreach activities are carried out show that it is highly oriented around the manifest signs and objects of well-being (Baudrillard, 1997), a characteristic of consumerism. Outreach activities are commonly programmed into three parts: activities, feeding and goods giving.

First, the activities that are being done are usually in the form of games and other fun exercises, under the simple purpose of “giving joy and making them (the poor) forget of their troubles even for a while.” Sometimes, it is even noticeable that some of the activities have become sources of enjoyment for the facilitators instead, while some of the target participants have become uninterested. When a happiness is manifested through smiles and laughter, the program is deemed to be a success. In other cases, activities are oriented around education; teaching the target participants about the environment, leadership, literacy or financial literacy. While such are indeed important, the teachings merely reinforce the existing liberal-capitalist idea of “every man for himself.” It frames a way of thinking that poverty is caused by lack of skill instead of “a collapse in the structure of opportunities” (David, 2000). The plight of participants are attributed to their individual failure, emptying the argument of the failure of the system they are trapped in.

Second and the last, feeding programs and goods giving replicate exactly what Baudrillard critiques as the myth of egalitarianism before consumption. For a brief moment in time, the inequality between the privileged facilitators and the underprivileged participants is blurred as they are able to consume the same food and goods. It also becomes a direct form of consumerism, one can only speculate how much capitalist firms have profited from such charitable activities.

On the surface, outreach and other charitable activities reflect countercultural and anti-capitalist values; however it did not take long before a powerful capitalist system was able to co-opt such ethics. Such acts of counter-capitalism are neutralized and channeled back into new forms of virtuous-consumption (Hickel, 2013). Sociologist Slavoj Zizek (2009) calls this the “redemptive quality of consumerism”—in the act of consumption, the consumers are not only buying their redemption from mainstream capitalism, but also its vicious effects on the world. As argued, outreach and charitable activities have become part of these “virtuous commodities” (Hickel and Khan 2012). Sociologist Jason Hickel (2013) puts it well “people think of this as a countercultural process – a process by which the individual resists society – but in fact it has become essential to the reproduction of capitalism, for the primary method of self-realization has become consumption.”

The infiltration of the capitalist system and liberal ideology into non-capitalist activities has been an evolutionary process of history. As noted before, German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (1997) argued that in a modern society, no one social sphere dominates the system; not even the economic system. However, even Luhmann admits that modernity is an evolutionary process that still continues to occur in society today. Scholars have also argued that Luhmann is more post-modern than he is modern (Moeller, 2006). In his famous the end of history thesis, Francis Fukuyama (1992) argues that the victory of the west in the cold war marked the end of history; the end of an ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberalism and capitalism as political and economic orders, respectively. Liberalism, as an ideology, is largely apolitical; with emphasis on individual rights and on compromise (Heywood, 2007), it breeds a centrist ideology and argues that the individual lives and dies by his own hand.  The dominating victory of capitalism and liberalism as the hegemonic forces of the world order explains how even anti-capitalist activities such as outreaches and charities are transformed into vehicles for consumerism and individual self-actualization, empty of any political critique of the larger social structure of the liberal world order as a possible root cause of poverty.

IV.             Conclusion

The American sociologist C. Wright Mills (1959) says it right: “when, in a city of 100,000, only one man is unemployed, that is his personal trouble, and for its relief we properly look to the character of the man, his skills, and his immediate opportunities. But when in a nation of 50 million employees, 15 million men are unemployed, that is an issue, and we may not hope to find its solution within the range of opportunities open to any one individual.”

Indeed, poverty, at its high levels in the Philippines, is beyond the milieu of the individual; poverty is a public issue that roots itself in the fundamental structure of Philippine society as it is embedded in the larger global political economy.

Baudrillard furthers his argument about consumerism and capitalism by including the structure of class. He argues that capitalism is a function of inequality; its survival as a system is highly dependent upon the maintenance of an order of privilege and class. The inequality that is inherent in capitalism is blurred by the myth of egalitarianism pushed by consumerism. The function of class and privilege is “precisely to reproduce caste and class privilege” (1997). In other words, the survival of a capitalist system is dependent upon the maintenance of inequality and class difference as it is hidden behind the façade of consumerism. However, while Baudrillard emphasizes that “the system knows only the conditions of its survival, it knows nothing of social and individual contents”, opportunities for redistribution and genuine equality lies in the social structure. However, in the Philippines, such a structure has broken down.

In his famous book The Anarchy of Families, Alfred McCoy (2009) traces inequality in the Philippines through the power structure that privileges a minority over the majority. The power structure of Philippine society has largely been built by the Spanish and American colonizers. During the Spanish colonial period, families who cooperated with the Spanish colonizers in their divide and rule strategy lorded over fellow Filipinos with vast amounts of land or haciendas granted to them. These haciendas were incomparable in terms of size to that of any other Southeast Asian country. American colonial policy further exacerbated this by giving the landed oligarchs institutional access to the state apparatus. When the privileged minority is able to control the state, the only institution powerful enough to redistribute wealth to the underprivileged is rendered useless in this regard.

It is disappointing to see the ignorance or sheer hypocrisy of policymakers in the Philippines to address the issue of poverty. According to Filipino sociologist Randolf David (1999), every administration had attempted to solve poverty while choosing to turn a blind eye to the larger social structure that maintains it. Cory Aquino treated it as a matter of charity, Ramos viewed it as an inevitable consequence of economic development, and Estrada treated it hand in hand with development. However, all these efforts merely reproduce the inherently unequal capitalist system, hypocritically legitimizing it as a solution to poverty. Indeed, Baudrillard (1997) says it best, “if poverty and nuisance cannot be eliminated, this is because they are anywhere but in the poor neighbourhoods. They are not in the slums or shanty-towns, but in the socio-economic structure.” When the economic elites are also the ones steering the state, any radical change to the unequal structure of Philippine society will never happen.

References

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Bschaefer. 2013. The Society Pages. November. Accessed March 2014. http://thesocietypages.org/sociologylens/2013/11/29/holiday-giving-the-role-of-charity-in-capitalism/.

David, Randolf. 2004. Nation, Self and Citizenship: An Invitation to Philippine Sociology. Pasig: Anvil.

—. 1999. "On being Pro-poor." The Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 9.

—. 2000. "Understanding Poverty." The Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 15.

Durkheim, Emile. 1984. Division of Labor in Soceity. New York: Free Press.

Harper, Donald W. 2011. Structural-Functionalism: Grand Theory or Methodology? Leicester: University of Leicester.

Heywood, Andrew. 2007. Politics. Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan.

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Stuck in the Transition: The Filipino Family in Dominance

Structural functionalism is a broad perspective from the disciplines of sociology and anthropology that interprets society as a complex system that is beyond the human beings which comprise it. Its focal point of analysis are social structures and institutions within society, how they interact with each other and with individuals within the social system (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004). Tracing its origins, August Comte (1798-1857) introduced structural functionalism as a theory of society that emanates from biology. He finds the organism as a natural model for society; arguing that the way how an organism relates with its environment, how its parts interrelate within its overall system, and how it maintains balance is similar to the operation of a social system (Harper, 2011). Emile Durkheim, in his classic work Division of Labor (1893), expands structural functionalism in asking how exactly society is able to maintain a level of integration similar to those of organisms. He argues that through interdependency and interaction of individuals with more specialized roles, or mechanical solidarity, social ‘facts’ or institutions emerge which are beyond the individual and has a life on its own. For both theorists, the individual or human agency is downplayed as less deterministic and independent; individuals only act the roles or functions required of them by the social system.

Modern theorists develop a more sophisticated structural functionalist perspective. The German sociologist, Niklas Luhmann (1997), furthers the deconstruction of an anthropocentric view of society and argues that individuals are not integral parts of society; society is a system of communication. It is further divided into autopoeitic communicative spheres—the economy, politics, family, religion and etc.—that operate according to their respective functions based on their own medium and codes. Individuals do not so much act independently but rather participate in the function of a specific communicative sphere by using its medium (Moeller, 2006). That is, the individual merely traverses the different communicative spheres; he does not exist in himself, he exists as part of a social sphere.  The inter-relations of these communicative spheres make up the entire social system. Luhmann, however, emphasizes that in a highly modern society, no communicative sphere will dominate or be the overarching steerer of society unlike the dominance of religion and the family of traditional societies.

            The Philippines is caught in the transition between tradition and modernity. Such transitional societies are characterised by the dominance of a single sphere, invading other spheres and taking over their functions using its own terms. In the Philippines, the dominant institution is the family. Instead of functioning within its own terms of love, the family becomes a better vehicle for the functions of the economy and politics.

Businesses and capital in the country are often concentrated in the hands of a few families. Economic mobility and success then becomes divorced from economic merit; it becomes a function of familial relations and connections. As noted before, the cultural tradition of the extended family reinforces the dominance of the family in the economy. Big capital and businesses of families are further consolidated and strengthened through marriage or extended kinship. This is evident in the big business conglomerates and even in the small to medium industries in the country. The language of the economy is no longer that of merit and skill, but that of personal affection and preferences.

Photo from namfrel.com.ph

In politics, instead of political parties, families become the main vehicle to access the state apparatus. Political power rotates around political dynasties, made larger in terms of network through marriage and extended kinship. As a consequence, policies are no longer made on the basis of the public good; but on the interests of these families. This is most evident in the issue of agrarian reform. The rational policy is to pursue agrarian reform; but because the sphere of politics is dominated by the family who are landlords, agrarian reform never materialized in the Philippines.

The consequences of the family dominating these spheres of society are tremendous. It concentrates power in the hands of the few, disregards merit for personal connections and preferences, and leaves the majority of the public in worse conditions. Unless the less personalistic mediums of spheres of the state and the economy, for example, become better articulators of their respective functions, the family will continue to be the dominant institution in Philippine society.

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Money or Spending? Why Increased Finances Do Not Lead to Better Social Outcomes

Public expenditures are powerful tools of government to stimulate, direct and most crucially, democratize development; ensuring that the least of society does not get left behind. When allocated properly, public expenditures provide for the poor what markets easily overlook, such as education, health and other social services (Keefer and Khemani 2003). In 1991, the 8^th Congress of the Philippines enacted the Local Government Code (LGC) that devolved significant powers and responsibilities to local government units, or LGUs (Atienza 2006). None of these powers and responsibilities were arguably more crucial than the increased autonomy in fiscal policy—both in the source of finances and decision making in public spending (Hutchcroft 2012). The logic being that as LGUs are both spatially and knowledgeably closer to the people, they are the most efficient and effective institutions of governance to ensure development reaches the grassroots (Asian Development Bank 2005).

            However, what if public expenditures are not spent prudently and are largely misplaced?  Indeed, in the Philippines, this has been the case. Increased finances and decision making powers provided by the LGC does not translate to any significant increase in social services spending, even when poverty and population continues to increase (Diokno 2012). The failure of LGUs to fulfill the promises of decentralization have real and terrible impacts on the people at the ground. Instead of ensuring equitable development, these failed institutions merely exacerbate the vicious cycle of poverty.

The study provides counterfactual evidence to the common hypothesis that increased local finances and autonomy in public expenditure decision making does lead to better social outcomes in the form of increased social services spending. Whereas previous studies merely analyze statistics through convenient comparison at face value, the study contributes by employing a regression analysis of collated data of 80 Philippine provinces from 2009-2013. It finds that social services spending is either unaffected, barely increased, or even decreased by an increase in the internal revenue allotment, local revenues, presence of civil society organisations, poverty and population when increases in all are expected to follow an increase social services spending (Capuno 2005; Diokno 2012; Llanto 2012; Yilmaz et al 2008). Ultimately, the study finds that it is the absence of effective social accountability mechanisms and failed institutional design that are largely unable to check patronage and corruption; which, in turn, incentives the bad spending behaviour of LGUs in the Philippines. Further studies might want to explore other proxies for accountability and develop the accuracy of the dataset.

Review of Related Literature

Local Government Finances—The IRA and Local Revenues

            The intergovernmental transfer system in the LGC of 1991 (Title III, Chapter One), the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), provided for significantly higher, predictable and automatically-released funds for LGUs (Diokno 2012). It increased the share of LGUs from 20% of all internal taxes to 40% and was now mandatory rather than under the discretion of the national executive. The amount of the allocation followed a formula; provinces and cities received a share of 23% each, municipalities received 34% while barangays received 20%. These were all formulated with respect to population (50% weight), land area (25%) and equal sharing (20%). The IRA remained to be the central transfer scheme, but local government units also received shares from national wealth derived within their respective areas and wider tax powers (Llanto 2012).  Yilmaz et al. (2008, p. 22) argues that “the design of intergovernmental transfer systems has implications for accountability because it affects the fiscal dependency on central government and local revenue-raising ability.” Indeed, the IRA, as the chief intergovernmental transfer system, has unexpectedly had negative outcomes and influences on LGUs’ behaviour.

            The higher, predictable and formula-based grant system has resulted in greater dependence of LGUs on the IRA. Instead of being stimulative or motivating LGUs to supplement the IRA with local revenues for a more complete fiscal capacity, the IRA has increasingly become a substitute for local revenue generation (Diokno 2012; Llanto 2012). According to the 2008 data of the Bureau of Local Government Finance, the IRA accounted for 78.5 percent of total revenues for municipalities, 43.3 percent for cities and 73.6 percent for provinces. As the IRA’s share in the total LGU income increased through the years, tax revenue and nontax revenue shares have decreased (Llanto, 2012). There are political and economic explanations for such a trend. Politically, it is only rational for local politicians to rely on the IRA instead of taxing his constituents which might breed unpopularity and have electoral consequences (Hutchroft, 2012). Economically, the dependence on IRA is a result of the absence of a tax base for local revenue generation in most LGUs (Medella, 2012).

            Aside from LGU dependence and lag in local revenue generation, the local fiscal capacity of LGUs is also lacking. As mentioned before, most LGUs simply do not have wide enough of a tax base to generate revenue. According to World Bank data in 1994, LGUs with relatively more narrow tax bases such as provinces and municipalities, when compared to cities, receive 46 percent and 47 percent of the cost of devolved functions, respectively. Further, they divide the pie of the IRA with more players when compared to cities (Llanto, 2012).

            Exacerbating the problem of their lack in resources, LGUs have also displayed patterns of spending that indicate misplaced priorities. According to data from the Bureau of Local Government Finance in Table 1, the percentage of general public services in the local budget rose from 40.5 percent in 2001 to 44.1 percent in 2008; this portion of the budget is used for general administrative expenses, which are often subverted for patronage uses (Hutchcroft 2012; Llanto 2012). The budget share of that under other purposes also increased from 12.4 in 2001 to 17.2 in 2008, suggesting an overall opaqueness to the budget process as contrary to transparency. Surprisingly, the budget share of social services fell from 26.2 percent in 2001 to 20.3 percent in 2008. Economic services also fell from 18.6 percent to 15.1 percent, in 2001 and 2008 respectively. According to former budget secretary and economist Benjamin Diokno (2012), “these expenditure categories are expected to grow with population growth. The fact that their budget shares fell in the face of rising population (and poverty incidence) suggests deterioration in the provision of social services at local levels.”

Decentralization and the Accountability Deficit

            The consequence of the failure fiscal decentralization to ensure both capacity and effective spending is the imbalance of development across and within regions. According to Capuno (2005), what is more critical to regional growth is not increased finances and devolved functions of LGUs but the prudent exercise of such powers and responsibilities. Decentralization reforms have often been introduced without consideration of the implications of accountability; it places emphasis on increasing discretionary powers of LGUs on the logic of efficiency and effectivity (Yilmaz et al. 2008). Indeed, in the Philippines, both scholars and government officials have took notice of the wide discretionary space local chief executives exercise, often misused, powers in. Secretary Jude Esguerra (2001) of the National Anti-Poverty Commission observe that mayors are “budget dictators” who holds the power of the purse over councilors. He further notes that coupled with high proportion of local spending in personnel, mayors utilize a spoils system where patronage is the basis of who he hires within the city hall, with complete disregard for civil service laws. Paul Hutchcroft (2012) notes that resources are often spent on projects that provide the most visible impact such as basketball courts with backboards declaring the politicians name or the welcome signs found at boundaries. The allocation of resources are “likely to be based more on electoral considerations than technical assessments” (Hutchcroft 2012). Benjamin Diokno (2012) provides empirical evidence that LGUs spend more on patronage-rich and opaque items of the budget, which are general public services and other purposes respectively. Finally, Joseph Capuno (2005) argues that the low quality of governance, local public services and uneven regional development is because of the poor compliance of LGUs to local consultative bodies and other governance features of the LGC. Patronage, also, is largely expected and demanded of local chief executives. He argues, “where there is wide people’s participation and competent leadership, the levels and quality of local public services have been noted to improve” (Capuno 2005, p. 3).

            These different observations on the wide discretionary space of LGUs are paralleled with a diverse set of proposed solutions. The existing literature generally agrees that elections cannot be relied upon as effective mechanisms to sanction misbehaving local chief executives (Capuno 2005; Diokno 2012; Hutchcroft 2012; Keefer and Khemani 2003; Yilmaz et al. 2008). Keefer and Khemani (2003) particularly single out on the imperfections of the political market that disrupts the translation of popular preferences into government policy; particularly in the lack of information. They in turn advocate for more transparency, availability and the expanded reach of information to bridge this gap. Capuno (2005) argues that because existing electoral laws and procedures are weak in the Philippines, the participation of the people through civil society organizations are better able to exact welfare benefits and increase the quality of social services. Yilmaz el al. (2008) agrees with Capuno that because the internal control environment and internal audits are non-existent in the Philippines, accountability exacted from civil society organizations are the last and best line of defense against misbehaviour. In particular, the authors argue these citizen organizations must participate in both the budgeting and expenditure process. Finally, Hutchcroft (2012) dismisses the misplaced hope placed on local reform strategies. He argues that the pervasive patronage structure in the Philippines operates throughout local-national dynamics that any hope of change should be directed at changing the institutional design of elections to be more proportional to successfully curb patronage in the country.

       
     The paper takes off from the ideas and observations made by these scholars and attempts to empirically and quantitatively test the validity of their arguments. Because the existing literature is largely in narratives and small-n cases, they necessarily sacrifice accuracy for depth. The value of this study lies in its ability to provide more comprehensive and accurate evidence to fill the gap of existing qualitative studies. By providing a statistical and large-n evidence, the study lays a stronger foundation for the existing hypothesis and proposed solutions.

Methodology and Operational Definitions

            Using a Philippine provincial level dataset recorded across the years 2009-2013, the study employs a panel-data estimation technique. We assume that the dependent variable Y, which indicates social services spending is linked to the amount of internal revenue allotment and a host of other possibly explanatory variables as follows:

            The model is in a log-level functional form as it is best able to capture the findings of the research in interpretation and generates the highest explanatory value. The absence of any interaction of variables and quadratic variables are consistent with both theory, empirical observations, tests against different models (See Table 2).

            The dependent variable of social services spending is used as a metric for social outcomes and welfare. Public expenditure on social services have the most direct impact on the welfare of the poor as they provide a steady and reliable stream of goods that are directly consumed, protecting the poor from adverse market effects (Snyder and Yackovlev 2000).

            The independent variable of the IRA is used as both a metric for LGU finances and patronage, representing the lack of accountability in public finances. Hutchcroft (2012, 113) argues that “for all the celebrated talk of promoting local autonomy and instituting fiscal decentralization, the IRA is also very much a story about the enhanced access of local politicians to patronage resources.” The hypothesis is that an increase in finances, in the form of the IRA, translates to more social services spending, but only to a marginal level as it is still largely misused for patronage purposes.

            The other independent variable of local revenues is used both as a metric for LGU finances and degree of autonomy. Whereas the LGC of 1991 provides LGUs with a more expansive power of taxation and collection of other fees to generate revenue, the share of local revenue from the total revenues of LGUs have been on a decline (Diokno 2012; Llanto 2012). This suggests that far from the goal of autonomy, LGUs are still largely dependent on national government for its resources. The hypothesis is that an increase in finances, in the form of local revenues, increases social services spending but less than the increasing effect of the IRA. This hypothesis reflects the small share of local revenues on total revenues and the dependency on the IRA.

            Another independent variable are civil society organizations, used as a metric for accountability. Different scholars have noted of the failure of formal legal-institutional accountability mechanisms and look to societal accountability as alternatives to check on government (Arugay 2005; Capuno 2005; Yilmaz et al. 2008). More than legal-institutional mechanisms, the role of civil society organizations as watchdogs are more political in nature and thus, a variable to the equation. The hypothesis is that an increase in the number of civil society organizations translates to more social services spending as LGUs are checked to spend more prudently.

            The final two independent variables are poverty, as measured by poverty incidence or the number of households under the poverty line, and population. It is well established that the logic of public expenditures, on social services most especially, is to provide for the poor what markets fail to (Keefer and Khemani 2003; Snyder and Yackovlev 2000). It is therefore expected that as poverty incidence increases, there ought to be more social services spending. Also, population growth is support to coincide with increased spending on social services for the quality to not degrade (Diokno 2012).

 Data

To find the effect of the IRA on social services spending, the study employs a collated a provincial-level dataset obtained from the Bureau of Local Government Finance, Local Government Academy, Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO), and the National Coordinating Statistical Board. Specifically, the dataset constitutes a panel of 80 provinces from 2009 to 2013. However, data for the variables poverty and population are taken from the years 2011 and 2010, respectively, as these years are the latest of censuses that are conducted in intervals and are assumed to be constant. The data for NGOs from 2011 are also assumed to be constant due to the difficulty of obtaining yearly data. The list of provinces excludes Dinagat Islands due to the absence of significant data throughout the period covered. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the regression variables used.

         
   The variables of social services spending, IRA, and local revenues were made uniform to be measured in millions. The variables of NGO and population are to be taken as nominal. Finally, the variable of poverty is to be taken in percentages. Under the minimum columns of social services, NGO and poverty, there are noticeable zeroes. First, Sulu in 2011 lacked official data on social services spending. Second, there were unavailability of NGO data in the provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. Finally, Batanes posted zero percent poverty incidence in the year 2011.

Results

            Table 3 presents the regression table of the effect of the IRA and other important control variables on social services spending. The estimates clearly suggest evidence in favour of the first hypothesis. It shows for every one million peso increase in IRA, social services spending increases by only 0.0182% or 182 pesos. The very minimal increase of social services spending confirm that a large chunk of the IRA is spent on other items. Further data from Diokno (2012) in Table 1 provide evidence for another assertion of the first hypothesis, that large parts of the IRA and LGU finances in general are misused for patronage and not transparent purposes.

            The second hypothesis, however, must be completely rejected. The regression results show that local revenues have no statistically significant effect in terms of increasing spending on social services. But instead of completely disposing of the logic of the hypothesis, the results merely validates the argument on a higher level. Whereas the hypothesis expected a positive but less effect than the IRA to signify dependence, the insignificance of the variable strengthens the assertion that LGUs are extremely dependent on the IRA in terms of financing. The evidence shows that the goal of the LGC of 1991 to provide LGUs “genuine and meaningful local autonomy” has failed.

             The results on NGOs is an interesting case. Whereas most if not all literature argue that increased people’s participation in the form of NGOs increases both the level and quality of social services (Bräutigam 2004; Capuno 2005; Krafchik 1996; Yilmaz et al. 2008), the estimation shows otherwise: for every increase in the number of NGOs, social services spending decreases by 1.23% or 12, 300 pesos. It is important to note that the literatures noted above were qualitative studies that did not employ statistical analysis, thus may explain the difference in outcomes. It is also possible that the dataset employed in this study is inaccurate as it is but the number of surveyed NGOs for the profiling purposes of the Local Government Academy and may not reflect the actual number of NGOs in the province. These considerations aside, the negative effect of NGOs on social services can be explained through a pluralist model of democracy. NGOs can be likened to interest groups that pressure the state for different policies and allocation preferences. It is important to understand that NGOs do not have common agendas and may be interested in allocations outside of social services spending. NGOs, therefore, may be rechanneling public expenditure away from social services and into their respective preferences.

Conclusion

Governments are powerful actors with the necessary tools in public expenditures to combat market failures that often hit the poor the hardest. The Local Government Code of 1991 sought to make public expenditures more efficient and effective by providing local government units with extensive autonomous powers and capacities. The logic being that as LGUs are both knowledgeably and spatially closer to the people, they are most effective in not only achieving development but more importantly, an equitable one. To achieve this, public expenditures made by LGUs must be based on the standpoint of what is optimal for development. The empirical evidence, however, points otherwise.

 The significant increase in resources provided by the IRA does not translate to significant increases in social services spending, even when the average poverty incidence in all provinces is at 26 percent. The same logic follows as poverty and population are deemed to be statistically insignificant in determining the level of social services spending. Further, local revenues, made higher by the IRA’s provision of more expansive taxing powers, is also statistically insignificant, suggesting that LGUs are still largely dependent on national government for resources. Finally, the decreasing effect of NGOs suggests that government may be privileging certain interests at the expense of development. NGOs, in effect, are failed experiments of social accountability.

To further the research, scholars may seek to include other variables for both internal and social mechanisms of accountability. A more accurate dataset on NGOs is also warranted and may change the outcome of this study.

Despite all considerations, the evidence leads the study to conclude that the current project of decentralization in the Philippines has failed. Despite the significant transfer of resources, responsibilities and powers to LGUs, the absence of effective accountability mechanisms allow local chief executives to exercise powers imprudently and thus fail to ensure both economic and human development. Codified rules and legislated frameworks rarely literally translate as intended into the social reality. For this reason, Book IV, Title II, Section 521 of the Local Government Code provides a mandatory review of the code every five years. Two decades and three administrations have passed yet no comprehensive review and amendments have been made on the LGC of 1991. Fortunately, a $250-million loan initiated by the Asian Development Bank on February 13, 2014 will make a review of the 20 year old LGC finally possible. Any review and corresponding amendments to the LGC of 1991 must take into account not only the technical and economic aspect of the code, but especially its political outcomes and consequences. The problems of efficiency in the IRA must be placed in context of a larger patronage structure.

Policy makers must be careful not to focus too much on the economic and technical issues of the LGC; a politically insensitive reform will not yield any desired economic outcome. In the final analysis, while these practical measures may curb unwanted tendencies and patterns at the local level, only a national-level political reform that destroys the systematic patronage structure of the Philippine state can any decentralization framework genuinely achieve its purpose.

References

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Asian Development Bank. 2005. Country Governance Assesment: Philippines. Manila: Asian Development Bank.

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Atienza, Maria Ela L. 2006. "Local Governments and Devolution in the Philippines." In Philippine Politics and Governance: An Introduction, by Noel Morada and Teresa Encarnacion Tadem, 414-440. Quezon City : University of the Philippines Press.

Bräutigam, Deborah. 2004. The People’s Budget? Politics, Participation and Pro-poor Policy. New York: The United Nations.

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Capuno, Joseph. 2005. The quality of local governance and development under decentralization in the Philippines . Quezon City: University of the Philippines School of Economics.

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Hutchroft, Paul D. 2012. "Re-slicing the pie of patronage: the politics of the internal revenue allotment in the Philippines, 1991-2010." In The Philippine Review of Economics, by Ramon L. Clarete, 109-135. Quezon City: University of the Philippines School of Economics.

Hutchroft, Paul. 2010. "Dreams of redemption: Localist strategies of Reform in the Philippines." In Politics of Change, by Nathan Gilbert Quimpo Yuko Kasuya, 418-454. Pasig: Anvil Publishing, Inc.

Keefer, Philip, and Stuti Khemani. 2003. Democracy, Public Expenditures and the Poor. Washington: The World Bank.

Krafchik, Warren. 2005. Can civil society add value to budget decision-making? A description of civil society budget work. New York: International Budget Project.

Llanto, Gilbert M. 2012. "The assignment of functions and intergovernmental fiscal relations in the Philippines: 20 years after decentralization." In The Philippine Review of Economics, by Ramon L. Clarete, 37-81. Quezon City: University of the Philippines School of Economics.

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