Deconstructing Duterte

The DDS and Duterte Violence: An Effect of Institutions

          The new institutional perspective is aptly used in analyzing political leadership at the local government level. It deviates from traditional institutionalism in considering not only formal rules (as expressed in laws), organizations and structures of government; but more influentially powerful, informal rules (as expressed in norms and collective identities) and broader institutional constraints (Lowndes, 2010). In summary, institutions are framed through rules that are, in effect, lived out by the actors.

Formal Rules

In light of the formal rules, the Human Rights Watch asserts that “Duterte’s rise as a prominent political figure coincided with a significant change in the dynamics between local officials and the police in the Philippines” (2009). Republic Act 6975, known as the “Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990”, as amended by Republic Act 8551, provides that the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) shall exercise administrative control and operational supervision over the Philippine National Police. Moreover, the Local Government code of 1991, under section 455 (b)(2)(v), provides that the city mayor shall:

“Act as the deputized representative of the National Police Commission, formulate the peace and order plan of the city and upon its approval, implement the same; and as such exercise general and operational control and supervision over the local police forces in the city, in accordance with R.A. No. 6975.”

According to insiders, there are no risks in the operations of the DDS because these are coordinated with the police, who intentionally leave or come late to the area of the planned assassination. Further, the police are underperforming or not performing at all in the investigation of these killings. Some policemen are also hit men themselves. It is alleged that mayor Duterte, as vocal as he is in support of the DDS, is the mastermind behind the operations. Given his socialized and socially constructed violent self, as even more strengthened through the Local Government Code of 1991 by giving the power to exercise operational control over the local police, it is a highly substantial allegation.

However, not all hit men are police officers. More often, they are hired shooters. They are also provided with .45 caliber pistols and other necessities for the operations. The funding of the DDS now comes to inquiry. According to insiders, it is alleged that the funding comes from the city government’s Peace and Order fund, which is allocated by the president to spend in their discretion for counter-insurgency and anti-crime programs (Human Rights Watch, 2009). In Davao’s proposed 2009 budget, it accounts for 450 million pesos of the 3.2 billion pesos budget (Philippine News Agency, 2008). Being matters of security, the Peace and Order fund is not accounted for or subjected to audit.

These formal rules, to an extent, define the parameters of Duterte’s behaviour. It can be said particularly of the R.A. 6975, the Local Government Code of 1991 and the Peace and Order fund are rules that provide a wide range of autonomy and discretion for the mayor. Coupled with the primary argument of the socially constructed violent self of Duterte, these loose formal rules allow and encourage the further development and proliferation of such behaviour.

Informal Rules

          Informal rules are largely based on the norms and traditions that results from the interaction of actors. In this case, there are two interactions of actors that contribute to the creation of such informal rules in Davao—the weak state vis-à-vis Duterte and that of Duterte vis-à-vis his constituents.

As argued by Migdal and Abinales, the Philippines has not been successfully transformed by the wave of modernization. Societies are unaffected by attempts at rationalizing its structures; it remains to be largely built kinship, traditions and customs. This is largely due to the peculiar and long colonial history of the Philippines, which alienated Filipinos from a subjugating foreign government that left them to fend for themselves and rely on their kins. The superimposition of the nation-state on these primordial societies resulted into a constant struggle between the state and the local strongman. Being incapacitated by the power of the local strongman, the weak state therefore resorts to compromise and accommodation for stability, consolidation, and access to the local population.

Such power relations between the weak state and the strong society have created certain informal rules and norms. As Huntington (1968) asserted, the issue is not modernization but that of governance. Weak states govern through compromise and accommodation, not of imposition or hegemony. This creates an informal rule that for the state to effectively govern and ensure stability, it must not limit the powers and disrespect the authority of the local strongman in his domain to an extent not of his liking. As proved by the Marcos' move to centralization during Martial Law, doing so would result to political turmoil and instability.

In that sense, it is an informal rule, as much as it is a formal one enshrined in the Local Government Code of 1991, and an imperative that national government must not meddle with the affairs of Duterte in Davao. This would explain why administration after administration, Duterte remains unsanctioned despite the years of alleged human rights violations. Also, from the new institutional perspective, this informal rule further proliferates the violent character of Duterte.

For six terms as mayor, Duterte and his constituents in Davao have had a long period of constant interaction. In the beginning of Duterte’s political career as an appointed OIC vice mayor, the call of Dabawenyos was that of peace and order, having been threatened by insurgency attacks. Duterte delivered on the call for peace and order, which made him highly popular amongst Dabawenyos. In each term for the next six, Duterte ran on his perennial platform of bringing and maintaining peace and order in Davao. The electorate have swept him to power every time despite, or even because of, their belief of his involvement in the extra judicial killings; thus, Duterte considers this as his mandate. The existence of such a culture and collective identity can be proved by the dissatisfaction of Dabawenyos of Benjamin Guzman, who served as mayor due to Duterte's term limit, because of his failure to embody a tough persona and inability to maintain peace and order. Moreover, it is more evident in the overwhelming support of the people for Duterte every election time. The continuous and stable interaction between Duterte, who embodied the tough guy every criminal is afraid of, and his constituents, whose call and mandate for any mayor has always been based on peace and order, has created a collective identity and political culture founded on the values of toughness, action and peace and order.

Informal rules are also expressed, and possibly none more binding, in the collective identity and political culture of a people in a given place. Unlike public opinion which is simply people's reaction to specific policies and problems, these are long term values that are entrenched in institutions and lived out its actors (Heywood, 2007). From an institutional perspective, the collective identity and political culture of Davao plays a big, if not the biggest, role in defining and maintaining the tough and violent character of Duterte.

Duterte Dynamics

            The Marxist tradition asserts a different view on political culture. Rather than rising from the grassroots, it is a top-down induced phenomenon. Political culture is actually nothing more but elite ideology (Heywood, 2007). It becomes a non-coercive power, called hegemony, by which the people are dominated by the ruling class through the dissemination of what Engel’s calls “false consciousness.”

            How Duterte is able to dictate the dynamics within Davao and circumscribe efforts of political opponents and other groups of civil society groups can be framed through the Marxist lens. As mentioned before, Duterte is both a created by and creator of the political culture in Davao. Beginning with success in responding to calls for peace amidst NPA-dominance, Duterte sustained the popularity through continuous peace and order efforts. Through years of continuous interaction with his constituents, such a political culture and identity has been created and reinforced.

            Duterte has used the political culture he created in Davao to defeat political opponents and instill fear among those in civil society. To do this, Duterte allegedly employs a dissemination of false consciousness based on fabricated incidents of crime. This was evident most especially during the 2010 local elections, when Representative and former House Speaker Propsero “Boy” Nograles challenged Duterte’s daughter, Sarah Duterte, for the seat of Mayor. When reports of the increased popularity of Nograles through surveys came out, isolated cases of crimes suddenly threatened the city. It was alleged that Duterte was behind these petty crimes to stimulate the culture of peace and order in the city that only the Dutertes successfully embodied and ensured. This strategy lead to a victory margin of more than 220, 000 votes for the younger Duterte. 

In consideration of the presence of such dynamics and the identified institutionalised rules, strengthening transparency and accountability measures, both horizontal and vertical, will be able regulate Duterte’s behaviour without radically altering his powers to maintain stability in the local level. For one, the Peace and Order fund must be audited and accounted for by an independent special committee sworn to confidentiality rather than being loose discretionary funds. If the use of funds is found suspicious, it must be investigated upon and made transparent to the people. Further, the police force will remain under the control of the mayor but orders and activities must be recorded, investigated if found suspicious and made transparent if proven. These mechanisms would provide evidence, which has been lacking to back up allegations against Duterte. With evidence, the state will be able to sanction Duterte accordingly. Also, such mechanisms will be able to affect, if not totally reverse, the political culture and collective identity of Davao. Transparency and accountability measures will provide the state with evidence to sanction Duterte, and the people of Davao with information that could question his legitimacy. Local strongmen are most concerned with looking legitimate, which the state can provide. With such mechanisms in place demystifying his behaviour, Duterte must think twice before he employs violence.