 |
| Photo from telegraph.co.uk |
By strict Western standards and conventions, Hugo Chavez was a dictator.
He violated innumerable human rights, crushed democratic institutions and
imprisoned a free market economy; the caveat—by strict Western standards. It is
easy to forget that definitions and information are functions of power; in this
case, the power of a global hegemon like the United States sets the discourse
on the undemocratic political character of Venezuela’s charismatic leader. But Chavez
has never been one to bow down to great powers and conventions; and he makes no
exemption in challenging the dominant idea of what makes for a good leader for
a democratic regime.
A good leader for a democratic regime knows when to accept defeat.
Democracy entails a competition for power; what makes it work is when losers do
not resort to extreme measures to overthrow clear winners and wait until the
next opportunity. Hugo Chavez first burst into the political scene as a
military coup leader against a corrupt President Carlos Andrés Peréz that
tolerated no popular dissent on the streets, even to the extent of critically
harming over 3, 000 people. Unfortunately, it was an abortive coup. But Chavez
accepted defeat gracefully; through a televised speech, Chavez willingly
surrendered, but he swore to come back strong; and indeed, he did. Chavez rose
from incarceration to win the 1998 presidential elections by a wide majority. A good leader for a democratic regime knows
when to accept defeat, but they never quit on their principles and beliefs.
A good leader for a democratic regime hides no intentions and acts
on his promises. Democracy is built on trust; it only works when those who are
entrusted with power are open with their intentions. Chavez ran on an extreme
platform with socialist policies such as nationalizing the oil industry and
fundamental ones such as constitutional change. He expressed his intentions at
the beginning, not misleading the electorate with centrist promises only to act
radically once placed in power. More importantly, however, Chavez fulfilled these
promises. On his first year of office, he immediately changed the constitution
and dismantled the uneven power structure that plagued Venezuelan democracy. He
nationalized the oil industry and brought back its revenues to the people. A
good leader hides no intentions; and he acts on those intentions fast and
without excuses.
A good leader speaks truth and stands up to power; and he does so
with vigor. Democracy is not only confined in domestic politics; it often is in
deficit dangerously under the radar in the international order where a global
power dominates. Chavez’s popular appeal, especially to the global South,
largely rests on his unashamed, uncompromising and unfearful challenge to the
global hegemony of the United States. He not only rejects neoliberal policies
that continue to shackle his country in structural poverty, he does so sending
a strong message; condemning President Bush of the United States as “the devil”
to an audience of all other states of the world in the United Nations must
challenge the beliefs of benevolence in the hegemon. He not only exposes the
undemocratic foreign policy of the world’s leading power, he set the path for
the rest of the states south of the border to stand up against it. A good
leader does not only stand up to power; he inspires others to do the same.
A good leader, however, ultimately bows down to real power—the
people. Democracy is rule of, for and by the people; more important than
adherence to democratic processes are the production of democratic results of
poverty reduction and social justice.
Chavez respected the democratic mechanisms to gauge the public pulse,
submitting plans, intentions and himself to referendums and elections. When the
popular will went against his, such as the referendum results against his
attempt to abolish term limits for the presidency, he respected the desire of
the people. Although immensely popular, he still submitted himself to elections
every year and winning them by an overwhelming majority each time. He was a man
of the people; refusing to sit on his ivory presidential tower, but always
driving around in his jeep to see his people first hand. More substantially,
Hugo Chavez was a man who could boast of results; reducing poverty,
unemployment and mortality rates in his country. A good leader bows down to his
people whether they are for or against him, and ensures he helps them
regardless.
The Philippine case is not so different from pre-Chavez Venezuela;
high rates of poverty, large and growing gap between the rich and poor yet
natural resource-gifted, and exclusionary and elite-dominated institutions. Both
countries have a common colonial experience and legacy from the Spanish. Both
also have been victims of imperialist IMF-imposed structural adjustment
programs. It is not difficult to see the parallels between the Philippines and
Venezuela—it becomes inevitable for any observer to ask why are the trajectory
of both states different?
Much of the difference could
be accounted for the difference in leadership. Indeed, Hugo Chavez is a once in
a lifetime political leader who cannot be replicated; however, the principles
of equality and social justice can be embodied by any political leader willing
to adopt them. The question is not simply why Philippine leaders are unlike
Hugo Chavez but why Philippine political dynamics and institutions prevent
left-leaning leaders from taking power.
It is easy to forget that what sparked the revolution in Venezuela
was not the military and its famed leader, but the explosion of discontent and
disgust by the entire civil society. This burst of public anger was immediately
capitalized by the organized left to take the reins of government, which in
this case was Chavez. What triggered and sustained the revolution was not
Chavez alone, but civil society who grew uncompromising and deeply disgusted
with the current system and its pool of elites. It is difficult to say the same
for the Philippines; the closest the country came to an explosion of public
disgust was in the People power revolution, but even that was not enough to
refuse elites of the same pool and interests to replace the dictator. Credit
may be given to Philippine elites and their cunning and effective tactics to
capture the state; but greater pressure must be placed on civil society, if not
to organize and challenge for political power, then vehemently reject the
dismal reality of poverty and inequality which they live in and the elites who
predatorily rule over them. It is in times of great crises when civil society
possess the leverage and actual power to overhaul the system. The Philippines
now is in a series of crises where government officials are exposed of
predatory and large-scale corruption and the President is exuding signs of
authoritarian tendencies. The spotlight must not be on those in power, but
those under power and what they do to change the system.
Upon Chavez’s overwhelming mandate to the presidency, he rallied the
public to change the constitution, the fundamental institution of the state,
which reflected the exclusionary structure and the elite interests that
dominated Venezuelan society. Constitutional change set the precedence to a
more widespread revamp of institutions.
Any revolution is only genuine and sustainable when elite-dominated
institutions are destroyed and replaced by popular ones. In the Philippines, it
is difficult to further any institutional change even if the constitution provisions
are in place because the elite-dominated legislature refuses to pass any
enabling law detrimental to their interest. The role of civil society in this
regard again is in focus; without a civil society that rejects elite dominated
institutions and leaders, the Philippines will only continue on the endless
cycle of inequality, poverty and exclusion.
